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So-called "snap removal" removal of a case from state to federal court
prior to service on aforum state defendant has dividedfederal trial courts
for 20 years. Recently, panels of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have
sided with those supporting the tactic even though it conflicts with the general
prohibition on removal when the case includes a forum state defendant, a
situation historically viewed as eliminating the need to protect the outsider
defendantfrom possible state court hostility.
Consistent with the public policy underlying diversity jurisdiction
availability of a federal forum to protect against defending claims in an
inconvenient or hostile forum such removals are barred so long as a
resident defendant is properlyjoined "and served. " Defendants preferring
the federal forum have invested significant resources monitoring state trial

dockets in order to race to remove before service on forum defendants can
be effectuated.
Where such snap removal is permitted, defendants, both in-state and
outsiders, are allowed to select their preferred forum an outcome in
derogation of the history, purpose, and logic of permitting removal. This
clever strategyof defense counsel is facilitatedand acceleratedby electronic

docket monitoring and sometimes (as in the Third Circuit case) attorney
trickery amounting to deceit.
The recentfederal appellate decisions are regrettable both in taking the
wrong fork of the metaphoricalroad regardingsnap removal and in shifting
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the trial court landscapefrom one of resistance to snap removal to one of
toleration.
Disturbingly, the appellatedecisions (without recordeddissent) analyzed
the issue through the simplistic lens of textual literalism with nary a nod to
the history, purpose, and public policy of federal removal law. In doing so,
the circuitpanels not only reached a problematic result but also displayed
an impoverished interpretative methodology.
Corrective action by Congress can put a stop to these mistaken results in
a manner that vindicates the intent and purpose of the 1948 Congress that

added the service requirement and that adequatelyprotects the interests of
both plaintiffs and defendants. We outline and assess the most prominent
suggestions for fixing the snap removal problem, including our own

preferred solution.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine teaching removal to law students in a first-year civil procedure
class. The students already know basic subject matter jurisdiction, including
diversity jurisdiction, which provides for federal judicial power over suits
involving citizens of different states.1 Generally speaking, a New Yorker may
sue a Philadelphian in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a dispute
involving more than $75,000.2 There must, however be "complete diversity":
In a multi-party case, all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants must be
from different states.3 The students also know that this same suit can also be

'See

generally 28 U.S.C.

§§

1331, 1332; BROOKE D. COLEMAN ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL

PROCEDURE ch. 1 (3d ed. 2018) (outlining federal subject matter jurisdiction, including diversity).
2

See 28 U.S.C.

§

1332 (setting forth diversity of citizenship requirements, including required

amount in controversy as $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest).
3

See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
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brought in the federal court in New York or the state courts of Pennsylvania
or New York if standards for personal jurisdiction and venue are met. 4
Now the students shift their study to the concept of removal to federal
court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, et seq., the general federal removal
statute.5 Although generally permitting a state court defendant to remove the
matter to federal court, the case "may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought." 6
Students generally grasp this aspect of removal without difficulty.7
Because diversity jurisdiction exists to protect a defendant from being sued
in an inconvenient or hostile state court, federal court is available.8 But where
the matter is commenced in a defendant's home state, the rationale of
protecting that defendant from a plaintiff's "home court advantage"
evaporates. 9 The resident defendant is at home. It therefore makes complete
sense that he/she/it should not be permitted to remove the matter from their
home state's courts. If there are other defendants from outside the forum
state, this limitation on removal makes less intuitive sense, but because of the
longstanding "forum defendant" rule, the presence of a single forum state
defendant historically has barred removal despite the presence of foreign
defendants.
Few if any students would have thought that the bar to forum defendant
removal could be circumvented by seizing upon the arguable glitch in the
language of its prohibition. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) prevents
removal so long as any of the defendants properly joined "and served" is not
a forum state resident. From this tidbit of language, clever defense lawyers
seeking removal have, with considerable but not unanimous success, argued

4

See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 6, 13 (explaining and illustrating concurrent jurisdiction

as well as noting that certain claims (e.g., federal antitrust claims) are subject to exclusive federal
court jurisdiction).

'See generally 28 U.S.C.
6
1d. § 1441(b)(2).

§§

1441-1449.

'Another author critical of snap removal would agree that this is "an easy civil procedure
hypothetical." See Valerie M. Nannery, Closing the Snap Removal Loophole, 86 U. CIN. L. REV.
541, 543 (2018) (using example of a car crash with diversity but a forum defendant to illustrate
restrictions on removal in cases involving a forum defendant but potential to evade this longstanding
norm through snap removal).

'Id. at 547.
9
1d.
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that resident removal is proper so long as any defendant moves swiftly and
effects removal prior to service upon a forum defendant. 10
When told of this potential loophole, students squint a bit in disbelief that
the purpose of Section 1441(b)(2) could be so easily circumvented by
outracing service of process. To them, it is obvious that the availability of
resident-defendant removal should not turn on the happenstance of docket
monitoring and the precise timing of service. The intent and rationale of the
restriction is clear: a home state defendant eliminates (or at least substantially
dilutes) the danger of state court prejudice against outsiders. Further, in such
cases all plaintiffs are outsiders as the presence of even a single forum state
plaintiff would destroy complete diversity and preclude removal.
While taking advantage of a technicality to gain advantage over an
opponent" may all be in a tricky day's work for company counsel (individual
defendants make relatively little use of snap removal), we find the
development disturbing on both substantive and jurisprudential grounds.
Substantively, snap removal is problematic because it unduly restricts a
historically recognized right of forum selection (so long as the forum satisfies
a range of requirements) 1 2 and shifts the balance of litigation prerogatives

0

1d. at 544-45.

"Regrettably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone

Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 2018) (involving Pennsylvania substantive law),
discussed infra text and accompanying notes 104-124, appears to have embraced a model of
litigation as gamesmanship as well as a strikingly stiff application of textualism when interpreting
statutes. In the process, the Third Circuit panel lost sight of more valid indicia of statutory meaning
while simultaneously blessing problematic litigation conduct in the course of unduly expanding
removal jurisdiction.
12 Defendants routinely decry "forum shopping" by plaintiffs. To be sure, one can find
examples
of some grimace-inducing tactics for seeking a favorable forum. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,

454 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1981) (finding that plaintiff lawyer's secretary became administrator of
decedent's estate in attempt to site lawsuit in California in connection with airplane crash in
Scotland; court ultimately applies forum non conveniens to dismiss U.S. action); Allstate Ins. Co.

v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (finding that plaintiffs successfully suede in Minnesota and
obtained application of Minnesota law for auto accident that took place in Wisconsin involving
Wisconsin citizens); see also Thomas

O.

Main, On Teaching Conflicts and Why I Dislike Allstate

Insurance Co. v. Hague, 12 NEV. L.J. 600, 600 (2012) (analyzing Hague as part of a symposium on
"worst" Supreme Court decision).
Advocates of expanded removal to federal court or expansion of federal jurisdiction through
minimal diversity tend to overlook the substantial hurdles a plaintiff must clear to prevail against a
defendant in state court, impediments that provide quite a good deal of protection to defendants and
refute the argument that state courts are hostile to defendants. Plaintiff must establish subject matter
jurisdiction (although not a big hurdle in state court), personal jurisdiction, apt venue sufficient to
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rather significantly in the direction of business defendants who prefer federal
court because federal judges and juries are viewed as generally more
hospitable to corporate defendants or perhaps even hostile to particular
plaintiffs or types of cases.13 Correspondingly, this has the effect of shifting

withstand a forum non conveniens challenge, standing, and (to state the oft-forgotten obvious) a
right to relief on the merits, which normally entails surviving a dismissal motion, a summary
judgment motion, two or more motions for judgment as a matter of law, and perhaps motions for a
new trial or reduced award as well. In light of this gauntlet faced by plaintiffs, defendant complaints
of unfairness being held to account for alleged wrongdoing in state court are not particularly heartrending.
And, of course, one can also find extreme examples of defendants successfully forum shopping
by commencing pre-emptive strikes in preferred jurisdictions when anticipating a plaintiff action
(declaratory judgment actions by insurers seeking to deny coverage are a common example) or by
including forum choice provisions in lengthy, boilerplate contract documents. See, e.g., Lamps Plus,
Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418-19 (2019) (enforcing arbitration clause and holding that even
if clause is silent on the topic class treatment of common or aggregated claims impermissible;
decision elevates Court's (by 5-4 vote) concept of arbitration over state contract law). See Linda S.
Mullinex, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute: The Titanic of Worst Decisions, 12 NEV. L.J. 549,

550-51 (2012) (identifying Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), which enforced a
Florida forum selection clause against passengers from Washington State alleging injuries, as one
of the "worst" Supreme Court decisions); Charles Knapp, ContractLaw Walks the Plank: Carnival

Cruise Lines v. Shute, 12 NEV. L.J. 553, 553 (2012) (also identifying Shute as one of the Court's
worst decisions).

"This conventional wisdom is reflected in the frequency with which defendants sued in state
court seek removal

with snap removal representing an extreme example. The defendants seeking

snap removal are doing so as a matter of company policy (reflected by the expense incurred to
monitor dockets) with essentially no time to make a case-specific assessment of the relative
strengths or weaknesses of state and federal court.
Accompanying the rise in snap removal has been a curtailment of personal jurisdiction,
particularly general jurisdiction that might have been invoked wherever a defendant has "continuous
and systematic" presence (the verbal standard prevailing prior to 2011). See Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924, 929 (2011) (concluding general jurisdiction is
normally available only where corporate defendant is "at home" by virtue of incorporation or

location of principal place of business); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-38 (2014)
(same); see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877-78 (2011) (taking narrow
view of specific personal jurisdiction in 5-4 decision); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,

137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (same). One arguable effect of this jurisdictional shift is to prompt
more plaintiffs to sue in the home state court of a defendant.
The conventional wisdom is that urban jurors are generally sympathetic to plaintiffs while
suburban and rural jurors are more favorable to defendants. Federal court districts are almost always
geographically larger than state court districts and therefore include a higher percentage of suburban
and rural citizens (as well as older, whiter, more affluent citizens) in the jury pool. Federal judges
are perceived as more sympathetic to corporate defendants and the needs of commerce by virtue of
the federal bench's more frequent background as business attorneys as compared to a state court
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outcomes in favor of non-liability or lower settlements by business
defendants and reduced recovery for injured individuals or small
businesses.14
Perhaps even more disturbingly, support for snap removal depends upon
an excessively literal textualist approach to application of civil litigation
statutes and rules that downplays or even ignores legislative intent, statutory
purpose, and the structure of federal litigation underlying two centuries of
law regarding subject matter jurisdiction and removal.15
Courts embracing snap removal unduly embrace textual formalism
without sufficient consideration of whether congressional drafters intended
such literal reading of their words. Functional aspects of law are given
insufficient consideration. 16 These elevate form over substance and reward
trickery, opportunism, and economic advantage while devaluing not only
plaintiff rights but also the structure of American legal federalism."
Rigid reading of civil procedure statutes and rules is problematic. The
sound basic idea of treating the language of a statute as the exclusive indicator
of meaning can become an instrument for missing that meaning. The words
of a statute, rule, or document are of course important. But reading them in
rigid isolation can easily lead to misinterpretation in derogation of intent,
purpose, and meaning of the statute, rule or document containing the words.

bench with proportionally more judges who are former plaintiff and legal aid attorneys. See ROGER
S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIG.

§ 4.5.8 184

(10th ed. 2016) ("Defendants

who are sued in state court should consider whether the controversy may be removed to federal
court and whether they are likely to benefit from the federal forum. Conversely, plaintiffs who have
chosen the state court will want to seek the remand of cases improperly removed to federal court.").
"We are not suggesting that removal to federal court inevitably means the defeat of meritorious
claims. But we do contend that even meritorious claims will be more difficult to successfully
prosecute in federal court and that lawyers recognize this (as reflected in the manner in which
defense lawyers seek removal and plaintiff counsel seeks remand), which in turn logically translates
to lower settlement value of cases removed to federal court.
15

See infra text and accompanying notes 138-160 (criticizing narrow textualism and in

particular its use in adjudicating snap removal remand motions).
16

See infra text and accompanying notes 138-160 (criticizing formalist jurisprudence in

contrast to more functional legal analysis).
17 Although it is perhaps a bit melodramatic to invoke the Founders for a debate about removal,
which we concede lacks the greater stakes of unfair search and seizure, cruel or unusual punishment,
or rights of free expression, we nonetheless maintain that in establishing the federal bench and the

parameters of its relation to state courts as well as diversity jurisdiction, those who designed the
U.S. legal system were interested in avoiding unfair local prejudice and did not endorse technical
evasion of state court based on the timing of service of process.
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Reading the words "and served" in Section 1441(b)(2) to permit snap
approval reaches an incorrect application of the statute that reflects the limits
of the textualist approach. We agree with those who favor a more functional
approach that incorporates the legislative intent, history, function, purpose,
public policy, and court system structure underlying diversity jurisdiction and
removal.
Nonetheless, this literal textualist approach permitting snap removal has
enjoyed strong support among the trial bench and has the so-far unanimous
support of the three federal appellate courts assessing the issue. Absent
Supreme Court resolution of the issue against snap removal, it appears that
only legislation can correct the problem.
I.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A. The Rationale of Diversity Jurisdiction
Diversity jurisdiction has roots in the Constitution itself. Article III
provides that the judicial power extends to all "controversies . . . between
Citizens of different States." 18 Diversity jurisdiction is codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, which gives trial courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions"
involving claims greater than $75,000 that are "between ... citizens of
different States." 19
Although the drafting history of this portion of Article III and the
Judiciary Act of 1789 is relatively thin, it is generally accepted that the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to provide a forum where litigants
disputing with those of other states could theoretically avoid prejudice
against outsiders. 20 Thus, diversity jurisdiction provides a means by which an

18

U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2.

1928 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
20

See 15A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

(addressing historical basis of diversity jurisdiction); Id.
basis and background of diversity jurisdiction); Id.

§

§ 102App.01

§ 102.02 (3d ed. 2020)

(reviewing constitutional

102App.03[1] (reviewing historical reason for

diversity jurisdiction) (sections authored by Martin H. Redish); John P. Frank, HistoricalBases of

the Federal Judicial System, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Dec. 1948, at 22-23; see also John P.
Frank, The Casefor Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 410 (1979) (contending that
state court prejudice against non-citizens remains a danger); John P. Frank, For Maintaining

Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 10-12 (1963) (same). Judicial opinions have historically
expressed this view. See, e.g., Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883); Bank of U.S. v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 67-68 (1809); Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1125-26 (6th Cir.
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out-of-state plaintiff can avoid the metaphorical lion's den of a state court
arena inclined to impose liability on an outsider for the benefit of a local
resident or to protect an insider from the claims of an outsider.21
The legal system gives plaintiffs, both resident and non-resident, a choice
of where to commence litigation. 22 Always somewhat controversial,23

diversity jurisdiction has at several junctures been under particular attack that
included calls for its abolition or curtailment. However, as commentators
have also noted, there remain solid arguments for retaining diversity

1973); China Basin Props., Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (N.D. Cal.
1992).

2

This view of and rationale for diversity jurisdiction would appear to hold even if the

traditional justification for diversity -a
outsiders

general concern over state system prejudice toward

is replaced with the more nuanced and perhaps legal realist-cum-cynical view that

diversity jurisdiction was established primarily to assuage the concerns of past creditors and future
investors who feared that state courts would not enforce contracts and debt collection efforts. See

MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§§

102.03, 102App.03[1] (showing the benefit of diversity

jurisdiction to out-of-state defendants in class actions); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of

Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495-98 (1928). Even if the framers were particularly
focused on state court prejudice toward creditors, this is but a refinement of the traditional
understanding of the rationale for diversity jurisdiction rather than a rejection. See also MOORE ET
AL., supra note 20,

§ 102App.03[2]

& n.11 (crediting diversity jurisdiction and general federal

common law of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) with substantial contribution to U.S. economic
growth through increasing investor confidence).
22Giving forum state citizens the option of state or federal court is, however, not particularly
consistent with the protection-against-prejudice rationale of diversity jurisdiction.
2
1See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 102App.03[1] ("Diversity jurisdiction is and always has
been controversial.").

'See id. §§ 102.04, 102App.03[1]-[2]; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REP. OF THE
FED. CTS. STUDY COMM. (1990) (recommending substantial reduction in availability of diversity
jurisdiction limited to complex multistate litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 127-37 (4 h ed. 1983) (favoring
substantial curtailment or even elimination of diversity jurisdiction); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139-52 (COLOM. UNIV. PRESS 1973); AM. L. INST., STUDY OF
THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, (1969); ROBERT H.
JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 37 (Harper & Row,

Harper Torchbook ed. 1963) (1955); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97,
99 (reporter of Federal Courts Study Committee supports diversity curtailment recommendations);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and Potentialfor

FurtherReforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979); William Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347 (1976); Felix Frankfurter, Distributionof JudicialPower
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928).
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and lawyers have consistently endorsed diversity jurisdiction

through both vocal support and use, including use via removal. 26

But despite its long history and continued support by major segments of
the bar, diversity jurisdiction remains constricted to a degree. Although it is
not inexorably required by the language of the statute or the rationale of
diversity jurisdiction, courts have for more than 200 years required that there
be "complete" diversity: all of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants must be
citizens of different states 2 7-at least as regards the jurisdictional statute. 28
The assumption underlying this requirement is that the presence of one or
more in-state defendants sufficiently suppresses any state temptation to find
for plaintiff on the basis of home state prejudice. 29 Although the validity of
this assumption can be questioned, 30 it has been essentially unchallenged over

25

See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§ 102App.03[2]

(collecting arguments justifying

continued availability of diversity jurisdiction including continued presence of local bias; existence
of urban-rural bias within same state; permitting attorneys option to litigate more often in familiar
court; and arguably better quality of federal courts due to credentials of judges, independence
afforded by life tenure, well-crafted rules; and relatively greater concentration of resources per
case).
26
1d.; Charles Brieant, Diversity Jurisdiction: Why Does the Bar Talk One Way but Vote the
Other Way with Its Feet, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20, 20 (1989); John J. Parker, The FederalJurisdiction
and Recent Attacks upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433, 437 (1932).
2
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
28
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967). Article III of the

Constitution requires only minimal diversity of citizenship. Hence, a statute may confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity, as does the federal interpleader statute, 28

U.S.C.

§

1335. Pursuant to Strawbridge and its progeny, 28 U.S.C.

§

1332(1) has been viewed as

stopping short of the full breadth of Article III diversity jurisdiction.
29

See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§ 102App.04[2]

(discussing Strawbridge and its rationale

for the complete diversity requirement).
"For example, consider a case in which Local Plaintiff A, the victim of a defective product,
sues Local Defendant A (the retailer), Local Defendant B (the wholesaler), and Foreign Defendant
C (the manufacturer) on a theory of defective product design. The obvious deep pocket here is the
manufacturer, who also may be seen as most culpable in a design defect case. The wholesaler and
retailer are proper defendants by law per MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916) and its progeny but may have done nothing more than participate in the chain of distribution.
Although there are two local defendants in the state court lawsuit, they are not the "target"
defendants.
If state court prejudice against outsiders is a reality (an assumption that may be outdated in the
more homogenized modern world), common sense strongly suggests that when jurors are deciding
who to blame for Local Plaintiff's serious injuries, the Foreign Defendant Manufacturer is likely to
be seen as the culprit.
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the years" and forms the basis for limitations on removal when one or more
defendant is a citizen of the forum state. And even if the rationale of the
forum defendant limitation on removal is suspect, it nonetheless has long
been "baked in" to the civil litigation system, nested with legal doctrine that
sometimes favors plaintiffs and sometimes favors defendants. If the forum
defendant rule is substantially weakened (via snap removal or any other
litigation innovation), the equilibrium of the system is disturbed absent a
countervailing development favorable to plaintiffs.
In addition to the amount-in-controversy requirement that limits diversity
jurisdiction (and removal as well), there are other aspects of the diversity
jurisdiction statute that effectively contract the availability of diversity
jurisdiction and consequently restrict removal.
For example, corporations are deemed citizens of their states of
incorporation and principal places of business,3 2 which case law has defined
as the managerial headquarters of the corporation.3 3 This means that there
are, for most corporations, two "home" states rather than one, which provides
plaintiffs with twice as many opportunities to defeat complete diversity and
limit removal due to the presence of an in-state defendant.

Consequently, the rationale of complete diversity as well as the rationale of the "forum
defendant" limitation on removal may be flawed to the point of being completely wrong, at least in
cases where the foreign defendant is the target defendant. But it is nonetheless the agreed rule that
should be sufficiently respected that it is not thwarted through snap removal.
3 At least by Congress or other policymakers. There has
never to our knowledge been a
legislative effort to amend 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332

to provide for minimal diversity that has threatened to

succeed. But see MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§

102App.04[2] (discussing modest congressional

expansion of diversity jurisdiction in reaction to Strawbridge);Press Release, Sen. Lee Introduces

Constitutionally

Sound

Tort

Reform

(July

20,

2018),

https://www.lee. senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/7/sen-lee-introduces-constitutionally-soundtort-reform (last visited Sept. 24, 2020) (stating that current U.S. Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah)
sponsors legislation to establish minimal diversity jurisdiction; and stating that proposed legislation
would allow "access to federal court for any case where at least one defendant is from out of state").
There has, however, been scholarly commentary arguing for change to the complete diversity
requirement. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 288 (3d ed. 1999); Debra

Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 119, 147-50 (2003);
see also James M. Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction,57 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
179, 180 (2005) (noting continuing resilience and even expansion of diversity jurisdiction despite
criticisms).

3228 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
33
See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010).
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Unincorporated associations are considered citizens of any state in which
there is a member. 34 This limits diversity jurisdiction significantly if not
eliminating it entirely for cases involving certain defendants. 5 Although
there are other provisions of the statute contracting multiple citizenship (e.g.,
equating estate representative citizenship with that of the decedent; 36
deeming an insurer a citizen of the policyholder's state 7 ), there are also
doctrinal exceptions to diversity jurisdiction for domestic relations matters, 38
probate matters, 39 and real property disputes. 40
In addition, there are other congressionally mandated exceptions to
diversity jurisdiction, 41 including a specific limitation on diversity
jurisdiction in cases where:
[a] district court may, in the interests of justice and looking
at the totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise
jurisdiction under [Section 1332(d)(2)] 42 over a class action

34

See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494
U.S. 185, 189 (1990).
35

For example, consider a creditor suing the Democratic Party or the Republican Party for an

unpaid debt. Even in a world where there are distinctly "red" and "blue" states, there are no states
with no Democrats or Republicans in the population. Even less vast organizations will have
members in many states. But the importance of this aspect of diversity jurisdiction may be
considerably

lessened to the extent that unincorporated organizations operate through any

sufficiently separate entities that have a distinct citizenship.
36

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(c)(2).

37

See id. § 1332(c)(1).
"See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694-95 (1992).
39
See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006); In re Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. 503,
517-18 (1874).
40
See DAVID F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE § 10.03[F][4] (7h ed. 2016) (noting federal
courts have "long been loath" to adjudicate local property disputes even if there is jurisdiction based
on text of Section 1332); Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention

Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1134-35 (1980).
41 See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 55 (discussing restrictions on diversity jurisdiction
involving "some relatively large class actions, interpleader actions in which the holder of a common
fund brings a lawsuit against all rival claimants to its own fund, and multi-party, multi-forum cases
involving multiple victims of a disaster").

4228 U.S.C.

§

1332(d)(2) results from the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which

provides expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions on the basis of minimal where the matter
in controversy exceeds $5 million so long as any member of the plaintiff class is citizen of a state
outside the forum state. CAFA was enacted in response to concerns that many state court class
actions were resulting in quick "sweetheart" settlements for counsel and lacked sufficient adversary
posture and development of the facts. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 404-05.
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greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the
members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate
and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which
the action was originally filed based upon [five enumerated
considerations].43
Thus, even expansions of federal diversity jurisdiction remain subject to
the tradition of a constrained view of such jurisdiction. It has long been the
rule that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and that federal
jurisdiction is to be strictly rather than expansively construed, 45 with doubts
resolved against finding jurisdiction 6 and in favor of remand47 of removed

4

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). The six enumerated considerations are:

(A) whether the claims

asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;

(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by the laws of the state in which the
action was originally filed or by the laws of other states; (C) whether the class action has
been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid federal jurisdiction; (D) whether the action
was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm,
or the defendants; (E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger
than the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members
of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States; and (F) whether,
during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other class
actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have

been filed.
See id. at (A)-(F).

44See

COLEMAN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 6 ("The federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction."). By contrast, state courts are courts of general jurisdiction that are open to hearing all
justiciable disputes without regard to the law involved or the identity or citizenship of the parties or
the amount in controversy. Id. at 5-7. That said, state courts doors may be effectively closed to
certain claims that are exclusively federal in nature (e.g., federal antitrust law) and for which there
is not concurrent jurisdiction. In general, however, a federal claim for relief may be prosecuted in

state court. See, e.g., Yellow Freight System v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823-26 (1990) (holding
claims arising pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-200e-17, may
be heard by state courts).
45

See City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941); Detres v. Lions
Bldg. Corp., 234 F.2d 596, 597 (7th Cir. 1956); MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 102.13.
46
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 102.13.
47 See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111-13 (3d Cir. 1990); Freeman v. Nw.
Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1985); MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 102.13.
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cases if the party asserting jurisdiction cannot successfully shoulder the
burden of persuasion. 48

B. The Rationale and Evolution of Removal
Diversity jurisdiction remains firmly ensconced in American law-but its
niche has generally been closely cabined. Removal enjoys or is burdened by
a similar status. It has existed for many decades and remains popular but is
constrained by some of the same concerns surrounding diversity jurisdiction
generally. A foreign defendant sued in state court may-provided certain
conditions are met-remove the case to federal court. Thus, forum shopping
by opportunistic plaintiffs hoping to trade upon home court advantage can be
constrained, at least in part. 49

"See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936); MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 20,

§ 102.14.

Similarly, the defendant removing a case typically bears the burden of

proof regarding the propriety of removal. See Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 1012, 1017 (2016) (removing defendant failed to meet its burden of demonstrating existence of

diversity jurisdiction); Conagra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC, 776 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th
Cir. 2015), aff'd on othergrounds, 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016); Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P'ship,
194 F.3d 1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that defendant's burden to establish jurisdiction
varies depending on whether amount claimed exceeds limit); Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel,
L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 ( 6 'h Cir. 1999); MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 102.21[3][a].
*"Removalalone does not, as discussed below, permit the foreign defendant to avoid plaintiff's
chosen state entirely. The case is removed from the judicial system of State X to the federal judiciary
of State X but remains in State X, the federal trial bench of which is likely to contain almost
exclusively lawyers who practiced in State X prior to appointment and who have longstanding ties
to State X. In addition, the jurors hearing disputes in federal court, like the jurors called to duty in
state court, are all residents of State X. Consequently, a move to federal court does not necessarily
eliminate whatever jingoism may exist in the bench, bar, venire, media, or general population of
State X. And unless there is something intrinsically more neutral about federal judges relative to
state judges, litigating in federal court, the removal may not eliminate local prejudice so much as it
confers other tactical advantages.
For defendants, the tactical advantages of federal court are considered significant by practicing
lawyers. Although federal trial judges may not be morally superior to state judges, they have life
tenure that state judges lack and are thought to be less subject to ruling based on concern for job
preservation. Although federal jurors and state jurors both come from the same state, unless a state
claim is filed in a very rural area, the state jurors will tend to come from a more urban environment
that is more economically, socially, racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse while federal jurors
will be disproportionately older, whiter, and more suburban or rural.
According to longstanding conventional wisdom, the rural jury will be more supportive of
business and more economically and socially conservative as well. Hence, the federal jury will be
less likely to render a large compensatory or punitive damages award.
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Removal, described by one court as a "judicial curiosity incidental to our
dual system of government," 0 is not expressly mentioned in Article III but
was established in the Judiciary Act of 1789.51 Removal has consistently been
among the more bedeviling aspects of civil litigation. According to one court,
"[t]here is no other phase of American jurisprudence with so many

Current federal civil procedure tends to be more favorable to defendants than corresponding
state procedure. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 decided a series of cases (the socalled summary judgment "trilogy") that made summary judgment easier for defendants to obtain.
See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 598-603. But many states have failed to embrace the trilogy

or did so only belatedly. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026, 1030-31 (Nev. 2005). And
according to conventional wisdom of litigators in states like Nevada, state judges remain less likely
to grant summary judgment than their federal counterparts even if the doctrine is congruent. See
generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF STATE COURTS AND STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE,
CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 22 (2015)
(finding summary judgment granted in only four percent of state court cases during 1992); ARTHUR
R. MILLER, THE ASCENT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR STATE COURTS
AND STATE LAW 16-20 (2008) (Paper presented at Pound Civil Justice Institute 2008 Forum for
State Appellate Court Judges) (on file with authors) (stating that majority of states have adopted
rationale of U.S. Supreme Court 1986 summary judgment trilogy but application varies by state and

judge); COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 811; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at Comprehensive
Study Guide (available on line for purchase) (on file with authors).
Treatment of motions to dismiss also differentiates state and federal courts. Both authorize use
of a motion to dismiss plaintiff cases for "failure to state a claim." See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (state
numbering may differ). But since 2007 and particularly 2009, federal courts have used a more
muscular form of the motion, one which permits the judge to ask not only whether the plaintiffs
have made allegations that if true would justify legal relief, but also whether the allegations and

claim are sufficiently "plausible." See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560-66
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at
609-10.
In addition, the availability of discovery in federal court has been curtailed somewhat by 1993
Amendments limiting discovery to matters relevant to a "claim" rather than the "subject matter" of
a lawsuit and requiring that discovery be "proportional" to the need for information and stakes of
the cases. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 470.
These and other factors combine to make federal court generally viewed as more hospitable to
defendants generally and to manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, retailers, banks, and insurers
in particular. These types of defendants routinely seek to remove litigation from state to federal
court.
50

Tinney v. McClain, 76 F. Supp. 694, 698 (N.D. Tex. 1948).

51 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§ 107.03.
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refinements and subtleties."" A leading commentator describes the history
of removal as "filled with confusion and incoherence.""
Removal, like federal jurisdiction generally and diversity jurisdiction in
particular, has a number of narrowing aspects. It must be sought within a
certain, strict time limit (30 days) following specific presentation and filing
requirements.54 Perhaps most important, even if complete diversity exists
between all plaintiffs and all defendants, removal has historically not been
permitted if any of the defendants is a citizen of the forum state. This is the
"forum defendant" or "resident defendant" rule.55
For example, a New Jersey citizen plaintiff alleging ingestion of tainted
food while on a guitar shopping trip in Nazareth, Pennsylvania may sue in
Pennsylvania state court the diner (a Pennsylvania citizen), its beef
distributor
(a
New
York
citizen),
and
the
Wichita-based
manufacturer/processor of the beef patties used in the tainted burger (a
Kansas citizen).

There is complete diversity, but the case may not be removed because one
of the defendants (the diner) is a citizen of the forum state. "The rule applies
to removal by any of the defendants, not just the forum defendant." 5 6 This
forum defendant limitation on removal has existed since the relative dawn of
removal. Its rationale is that the presence of the local defendant effectively
discourages state court bias.
The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide litigants
with an unbiased forum by protecting out-of-state litigants
from local prejudices. Therefore, it makes no sense to allow
an in-state defendant to take advantage of removal on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. Out-of-state defendants, on
the other hand, will be cloaked, at least theoretically, with
the "home court" advantage because they are being sued
along with an in-state defendant by an out-of-state plaintiff
[otherwise there would be no diversity jurisdiction]. Of
course, this argument fails to take account of the possible
finger-pointing that could occur among the defendants,
52
53

Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912).
MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§ 107.03;

see also Nannery, supra note 7, at 546-49

(describing history of removal and forum defendant rule).
54

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446-1447; MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 107.91[4][a], 107.140.
5528 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 107.55.
56

MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§ 107.55[1].
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which would put the out-of-state defendant very much at a
disadvantage in terms of the local-bias perspective.
Nonetheless, the general removal statute clearly precludes
removal if any of the defendants is a citizen of the state in
which the action was brought.5 7
In the above example, the rationale would seem unassailable in that the
plaintiff (New Jersey citizen) is if anything at a bias/prejudice disadvantage
relative to the home state (Pennsylvania citizen). But if we modify the
hypothetical to make the plaintiff a Pennsylvanian suing the famous Tick
Tock diner in Northern New Jersey5 8 (and the distributor and manufacturer)
in New Jersey state court, one has less confidence in the rationale of the
forum defendant rule. To be sure, jurors in Essex County New Jersey may
have a soft spot for a venerable local establishment. But that hardly equates
to similar attitudes toward the diner's New York wholesaler or Kansas
manufacturer. They are still outsiders that may be tempting deeper pocket
targets for jurors concerned about the financial consequences of a judgment
against a local business. Finger-pointing is almost sure to ensue.
But however undertheorized and overdone, the forum defendant rule has
been the law of removal for more than 200 years. 59 Rightly or wrongly, it
represents a long-standing public policy judgment by a legal system that
posits that state court hostility toward outsiders is sufficiently reduced by the
presence of a single in-state defendant to bar removal. 60
57Id.
58

Clifton, New Jersey, to be more precise. The diner, which sits on a major thoroughfare outside

New York City has become something of an iconic symbol of this genre of restaurants, sufficiently
so that it attracts celebrity visits. See, e.g., Mick JaggerTests New Heart Valve with Artery-Clogging

Meal, N.Y. POST (Aug. 5, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/08/05/mick-jagger-tests-new-heartvalve-with-artery-clogging-meal/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) ("Jagger was en route to Met Life
Stadium for a Thursday night Stones performance when ...

[h]e made a pit stop at Clifton, NJ's

trucker-friendly 24-hour Tick Tock Diner" where "[H]e had Taylor ham, eggs and cheese! With
disco fries and sloppy Joe to go!").
9

Lee v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

60

Although concern over local bias remains, there are also signs that policymakers have, since

the mid-20h Century, regarded the problem as waning over time, a view that supports arguments in
favor of further curtailment or even elimination of diversity jurisdiction and related removal.
Regarding one aspect of the 1948 revisions:
[a]ll the provisions with reference to removal of controversies between citizens of
different States because of inability, from prejudice or local influence, to obtain justice,
have been discarded. These provisions, born of the bitter sectional feelings engendered
by the Civil War and the Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurisprudence of a
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The removal statute has been amended on multiple occasions, 61 perhaps
most significantly in 1948, when the "properly joined and served" language,
discussed in more detail below, was added. 62 Most of the revisions over the
years are what might be termed housekeeping or organizational and linguistic
clarifications. 63
The 2011 amendments were more significant but did not substantively
address the properly-joined-and-served language, 64 a fact that has been used
by both proponents and opponents of snap removal in their arguments about
the practice. 65 Proponents of snap removal argue that the lack of any change
in the service requirement language reflects tacit congressional approval or
at least acceptance of decisions applying the literal meaning of the
requirement. Opponents argue that the absence of any substantive discussion
of the service requirement language in 2011 indicates that Congress has not
focused on the issue and is most likely unaware that half or more of the snap
removal decisions have taken a literalist approach to the statutory language
that undermines the larger statutory objective of the forum defendant rule.

nation since united by three wars against foreign powers. Indeed, the practice of removal
for prejudice or local influence has not been employed much in recent years.
See Committee Note to 1948 Amendments; Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification
Act, reprintedin MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§ 107App.01[2].

Subsequent developments suggest

that congressional staff spoke too soon. Although modern removal may not be based on genuine
concerns about local prejudice, its use has grown over the years based on the alternative motivation
of defendants to seek the more pro-defendant confines of federal court.
61 See generally MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§§

107App.01-107App. 113.

62id

63

See, e.g., Committee Note to 2011 Amendments; Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue

Clarification Act, reprinted in MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§

107Appl3[2] at 107App.-34.13

("[Revisions of the statute place] the provisions that apply to diversity actions under one subsection.
This change is intended to make it easier for litigants to locate the provisions that apply uniquely to

diversity removal."); see generally MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,
64

§§

107App.01-107App.113.

See Committee Note to 2011 Amendments; Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue

Clarification Act, reprinted in MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§

107App13[2] at 107App.-34.14

("Proposed paragraph 1441(b)(2) restates the substance of the last sentence of current subsection

1441(b), which relates only to diversity.").
65
See, e.g., Delaughder v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 360 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1381 n.6 (N.D. Ga.
2018); Reply Brief, Delaughder, 369 F. Supp, 1372 (No. 1:18-cv-04414-RWS).
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C. The "ProperlyJoinedand Served" Language
The original removal provision did not include the "properly joined and
served" limitation, which Congress made a part of Title 28 in 1948.66 As
noted above, the statutory removal provisions (28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450)
were significantly revised in 1948, at which time 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) was
amended to include its current language stating that cases qualifying for
diversity jurisdiction (and hence meeting the statutory requirement that
original jurisdiction exist) "may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properlyjoined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought." 67
There appears to be consensus that the "properly joined and served"
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) was added to prevent the abuse of the
forum defendant rule 68 by improper or "fraudulent" joinder of a forum citizen

66

See 1 Stat. 72, 79-80 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 114 (1940)); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948).

67

See 28 U.S.C.

68

§ 1441(b)(2)

(emphasis added).

Arthur Hellman, et al., Neutralizing the Stratagem of "Snap Removal": A Proposed

Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REv. 103, 108 (2016). The basic purpose of the
1948 "and served" language is agreed upon by commentators although they may differ in their views
of the propriety of snap removal. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Pre-Service Removal in the

Forum Defendant'sArsenal, 47 GoNz. L. REv. 147, 155, 161 (2011-2012) (finding snap removal
appropriate because of plain language of "and served" requirement despite tension with purpose of
the language); Matthew Curry, Note, Plaintiff'sMotion to Remand Denied:Arguingfor Pre-Service
Removal under the Plain Language of the Forum-DefendantRule, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 907, 931
(2010) (same); Jordan Bailey, Comment, Giving State Courts the Ol' Slip: Should a Defendant be

Allowed to Remove an Otherwise Irremovable Case to FederalCourt Solely Because Removal was
Made Before Any Defendant is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REv. 181, 209-10 (2009) (criticizing snap
removal as inconsistent with overall structure of removal and diversity jurisdiction).
This appears to be the judicial consensus as well, even for judges permitting snap removal. See,

e.g., Brown v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-3092, 2008 WL 2625355, at *7 (D.N.J. June 27, 2008);
Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 07-5045, 2008 WL 2247067, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2008);
Brown v. Organon Int'l Inc., No. 07-3092, 2008 WL 2833294, at *4-5 (D.N.J. July 21, 2008);
DeAngelo-Shuayto v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-3923, 2007 WL 4365311, at *3 (D.N.J., Dec. 12,
2007); Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y.);
Holmstrom v. Harad, No. 05-2714, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 11, 2005); Aredia and
Zometa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-0779, 2007 WL 2905247, at *2 (M.D. Tenn., Oct. 3, 2007); see
also John P. Lavelle, Jr. & Erin E. Kepplinger, Removal Priorto Service: A New Wrinkle or a Dead

End?, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 177, 179 (2008) (noting defense lawyer attracted to snap removal as a
tactic recognizes split in opinion and tension between "and served" text and its purpose of
preventing plaintiff gamesmanship without vitiating forum defendant rule resulting in divided trial
court decisions).
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defendant that was not seriously being pursued by the plaintiff but was only
named in the suit to thwart removal. 69
However, the published legislative history regarding the 1948 changes is
inconclusive. For example, there is neither a specific statement from
Congress nor from the Advisory Committee on Revision of the Judicial Code
(the "Committee"), regarding the addition of the "properly joined and
served" language.70 In addition, appellate court guidance regarding snap
removal, discussed below, has been slow in coming because of the limited
reviewability of remand motions.71
Despite the lack of guidance, it seems clear that the "properly joined and
served" requirement of Section 1441(b) was not intended to vitiate the forum
defendant rule but rather was designed to prevent the naming of nonlegitimate defendants from preventing removal. Though the legislative
history behind Section 1441(b) is cloudy, the generally accepted view is that
Congress added the "properly joined and served" limitation to prevent
plaintiffs from blocking removal by joining forum defendants they don't

69

See Nannery, supra note 7, at 548:

[H]istorical context makes [the service language's] purpose evident: 'The purpose behind
the addition of that language seems fairly clear - to bring into the statute the 'fraudulent
joinder' doctrine and to restrict other tactics, like failing to serve a properly joined instate defendant, which might otherwise be used to prevent removals which Congress had
authorized.'

(quoting Champion Chrysler Plymouth v. Dimension Service Corp., 2017 WL 726943, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 24, 2017))).
The fraudulent joinder doctrine holds that defendants against whom the plaintiff has no
plausible claim will be ignored in determining whether there exists complete diversity and
corresponding federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1332. See In re Briscoe, 448

F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2006). But see Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d Cir.
1985) (stating plaintiff's motive of joining forum defendant to defeat diversity jurisdiction is not
fraudulent joinder unless plaintiff lacks legitimate basis for claim against forum defendant). See
generally James E. Pfander, States as Laboratoriesfor FederalChange, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REv. 355, 365-66 (2008) (defending forum shopping against common criticisms and noting that
practice may enhance federalism and relative importance of state judicial systems).
70
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948) reviser's notes; H.R. REP. No. 80-308 (1947), as reprinted in
1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1692; S. REP. No. 80-1559 (1948), as reprinted in
1948 U.S.C.C.S. Special Pamphlet: Title 28, 1675; Letter from Hon. Albert B. Maris, Circuit Judge,

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Chair of the Committee, to Mildrim Thompson,

Jr., Esq. (May 10, 1946).
71

Cook v. Wikler, 320 F.3d 431, 438-39 (3d Cir. 2003) (orders denying or permitting remand

generally not reviewable).
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intend to serve or pursue.72 Whatever the rationale for the 1948 Amendment
to the removal statute, it seems clear that Congress did not intend to constrict
the forum defendant rule, to make it more easily evaded, or to elevate the
significance of the timing of service.
In Pullman Co. v. Jenkins,73 which remanded a case removed by an
initially unserved "Doe" defendant who was later identified as a citizen of
the forum state (California), the Court invalidated the removal, stating that,
"the non-resident defendant should not be permitted to seize an opportunity
to remove the cause before service upon the resident co-defendant is
effected." 74 But the unserved forum defendant in that case also destroyed
complete diversity, making the precedential impact of the case unclear.
Despite this, one extensive and influential trial court opinion read
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins as probative of a judicial understanding of legislative
intent that implicitly disapproved of snap removal. 75 Although this approach
creates the possibility that a defendant will be joined solely to defeat removal
without any genuine plaintiff intent to seek relief from the forum defendant,
the Pullman Co. v. Jenkins Court seemed untroubled by risk, reasoning that
a "the resident defendant [that] has not been joined in good faith" could be
disregarded for purposes of determining the availability of removal. 76
Although this seems the right approach, it obviously holds the door ajar
to improper naming of sham defendants by plaintiffs solely to defeat removal
rather than to actually pursue claims against a forum state defendant.
Although such improper or "fraudulent" joinder allows a court to disregard

72

See Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D.N.J. 2008) ("Congress

added the 'properly joined and served' requirement in order to prevent a plaintiff from blocking
removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does not intend to proceed, and
whom it does not even serve."); Stan Winston Creatures, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 181 ("The purpose of
the 'joined and served' requirement is to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a
defendant a resident party against whom it does not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even

serve."); Plymouth v. Dimension Service Corp., No. 17-CV-130, 2017 WL 726943, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 24, 2017) ("The use of the phrase 'properly joined' in § 1441(b)(2) stems directly from
the judicial development of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder. Why Congress chose to add the words
'and served' to 'properly joined' is less clear, although it probably was designed to prevent a
plaintiff from defeating removal by joining (even properly) an in-state defendant against whom the
plaintiff did not intend to proceed.").

73305 U.S.
74
7

5

7

6

534 (1939).

Id.
Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644-45.
Pullman, 305 U.S. at 541.
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the naming of the forum defendant," proving improper or sham joinder can
be difficult in practice. The same plaintiff who is willing to name a sham
defendant will probably be equally willing to contend that it really intends to
pursue the defendant, making it hard as a practical matter for courts to police
improper/fraudulent joinder in that the process implicitly involves a judge
concluding that plaintiff's counsel lacks candor. 78
"See id.; Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2001) (deeming
non-diverse defendant fraudulently joined when complaint failed to state a viable claim against that
defendant and other portions of record made clear that joinder was solely attempt to defeat federal

jurisdiction); Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding
plaintiff cannot defeat removal by naming defendants with no genuine connection to dispute);
MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§

107.52[4] (noting that improperly joined parties are generally

disregarded in assessing diversity jurisdiction and removal).
78 In many cases, of course, the problem is not so stark. For example, a plaintiff may legitimately
sue a forum state defendant seeking to hold that defendant liable for its role as an agent of a foreign
target defendant, but the court may rule that for the given cause of action (e.g., bad faith or unfair
claims adjusting by an insurer) that agents for a disclosed principal are not liable in such cases. The
court can dismiss the claim against the forum state defendant as a matter of law without casting
aspersions upon the motive of plaintiff's counsel.
In this sense, many of the tactics that defendants decry as "fraudulent joinder" are perfectly
reasonable attempts by plaintiffs to pursue a culpable individual or entity in the face of adverse
doctrine. Such efforts, even if arguments for changes in the law rather than based on current law,
should be countenanced by courts. The liability of insurance intermediaries is such an issue. See
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The "Other" Intermediaries: The Increasingly Anachronistic Immunity of

Managing GeneralAgents and Independent Claims Adjusters, 15 CONN. INs. L.J. 600, 625 (20082009). Eventually, such efforts may meet with success. See id. at 625-30 (noting that minority of
jurisdictions permit actions against insurer agents); see, e.g., De Dios v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No.

Am., 927 N.W.2d 611, 623-25 (Iowa May 10, 2019) (majority rejects liability for workers
compensation intermediary but strong dissent reflects judicial division and possible future success

of argument); Halliday v. Great Lakes Ins., SE, No. 18-CV-00072, WL 3500913, at *32-38 (D.V.I.
Aug. 1, 2019) (federal magistrate judge influenced by Iowa dissent and scholarly commentary
adopts modified version of agent potential liability sufficient to permit further discovery).
One person's fraudulent joinder may thus be another's argument for law reform or willingness
to fight an uphill doctrinal battle arguing that the instant case is sufficiently different from past
precedent to permit liability against the forum state defendant. Although a preference for state court
is not lost on plaintiff's counsel, this does not automatically mean that suing a forum state defendant
is inevitably a mere tactic for avoiding federal court. But reading defense bar literature, as might
many judges, one could certainly be given that impression. See, e.g., Steven Boranian, No "Real
Intention to Prosecute" Equals Fraudulent Joinder, DRUG AND DEVICE L. BLOC,
http://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/ (last visited June 8, 2017) (discussing large firm defense
attorney who recaps recent federal district court decision "that is worth highlighting because it
applies a fraudulent joinder standard that we think should apply more broadly. It has always puzzled
us

why

courts

are

hesitant

to

find

non-diverse

or

local

joined.... [P]laintiffs will frequently name a bogus defendant from . .

defendants

fraudulently

the forum state to defeat
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By 1948, "it was clear that the troublesome issue of improper joinder
required a less muddled solution than merely examining a plaintiff's good
faith in naming various forum defendants." 79 Congress added the "properly
joined and served" requirement in order to prevent a plaintiff from blocking
removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does not
intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve. 80
There appears to be no legislative history or other contemporaneous
evidence suggesting that by adding the service requirement Congress
intended to reverse the Jenkins approach of barring a defendant from seizing
an opportunity to remove a matter by racing to the courthouse before service
could be made upon a forum defendant. As one trial court in a particularly
detailed and reflective opinion concluded, "Congress appears to have added
the language only to prevent the then-concrete and pervasive problem of
improper joinder." 81 The court elaborated:
Indeed, it is inconceivable that Congress, in adding the
"properly joined and served" language, intended to create an
arbitrary means for a forum defendant to avoid the forum
defendant rule simply by filing a notice of removal before
the plaintiff is able to effect process.
Defendants argue, unavailingly, that the addition of the
language signaled an intention by Congress to "narrow this
exception to the statutory right of removal." There is nothing
in the history of the removal doctrine, legislative or
otherwise, which even suggests why Congress would have

the defendant's right to remove"); Jessica Davidson Miller & Milli Kanani Hansen, FightingBack
FraudulentJoinderin PharmaceuticalDrug and Device Cases, RX FOR THE DEF., Vol. 20, Issue

1 (April 13, 2012), https://www.venable.com/-/media/files/publications/2012/04/fda-regulationsand-the-regulation-of-constitution/files/fda-regulations-and-the-regulation-ofconsitutiona/fileattachment/2012drugand-medicaldevicerxforthedefensevol20issue.pdf

(article by

large law firm attorneys in newsletter of Drug and Medical Device Committee of the Defense
Research Institute suggests fraudulent joinder occurs with some frequency and outlines techniques
for challenge); see also James M. Beck, Third Circuit Green Lights Pre-Service Removal, THE
VOICE , Vol. 17, Issue 34 (Sept. 5, 2018) (large firm defense attorney reviews Encompass Ins. v.
Stone Mansion,

discussed at infra text and accompanying

misleadingly in our view

notes 114-124, and suggests

that pre-service removal has value as a means of fighting fraudulent

joinder and "litigation tourism").
79

Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 645.

80

Id.; Stan Winston Creatures,314 F. Supp. 2d at 181.

81 See Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
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intended to limit the forum defendant rule. In fact, Congress
has never deviated from the "fundamental precept of the
American court system" that federal jurisdiction is very
limited.
Instead, the fact that the legislative history is all but silent on
the issue suggests that Congress did not intend to address a
novel concern of, fundamentally change the nature of, or
narrow the scope of the rule. Indeed, the very lack of
discussion in the legislative history strongly suggests that
Congress intended nothing more than to bolster the already
existing efforts of lower federal courts to prevent improper
joinder.

Congress could not possibly have anticipated the
tremendous loophole that would one day manifest from
technology enabling forum defendants to circumvent the
forum defendant rule by, inter alia, electronically
monitoring state court dockets. Thus, Congress would have
had no thought to wording the statute with this modern
problem in mind. 82
D. The Mechanics and Machinations of Snap Removal
The typical snap removal scenarios tend to divide into two basic types.
Some are the type of race-to-the-courthouse, Flash Boys scenario, 83 where a

82Id.
83

As one court has observed, snap removal is reminiscent of the practice of ultra-rapid stock

trading reflected in Michael Lewis, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014) (discussing use
of faster communication by better-resourced traders that enables "front running" of orders placed
by investors, which author sees as making U.S. equity markets less transparent and democratic and
slanted in favor of well-placed insiders). See Fiskus v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 14-CV-3931,

2014 WL 4953610, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014) ("While several courts have adhered literally to
the statute and allowed pre-service removal by a forum defendant, the Court believes that such an
interpretation leads to an unintended result, allowing a 'Flash Boys' approach to speedy removal to
override the rule's purpose.").
Flash Boys examines the practice of traders using their superior technology to buy and sell in
mere seconds or portions of a seconds faster than others in order to reap market gains that although
individually small are collectively large
fast pipelines for conducting trades.

large enough to justify the high cost of fiber optic ultra-
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defendant with substantial resources (such as a pharmaceutical company) or
its counsel is regularly monitoring state court dockets. When a lawsuit against
it is discovered-something that happens almost instantly-the defendant
contacts counsel and seeks to remove as soon as possible. Removal is
sometimes accomplished in matter of hours or perhaps even minutes.8 4 In the
meantime, plaintiff may be making what would be regarded as reasonable
service efforts that are no match for the speed of this archetypal snap removal.
A second common scenario is that the defendant, although not monitoring
state court dockets, is inclined to remove most all cases against it. Defendant
becomes aware of the litigation when plaintiff's counsel requests waiver (or
acceptance) of service under state rules or after service upon a non-forum
defendant.
Here, either a forum or foreign defendant can seek what might be termed
"snappish" removal by acting quickly but not because of instantaneous
docket monitoring. The non-forum defendant knows it is served and from
reading the complaint knows that plaintiff has also sued a forum state
defendant. A quick check with the co-defendant confirms that plaintiff has
yet to effect service on it, permitting the non-forum defendant to "stroll" to

As author Lewis and others have concluded, the practice has rather limited socio-economic
utility and perhaps even more socio-economic cost. The profits made on flash trading are not really
investments in solid companies and do not foster long-term growth or wealth of companies,
investors, consumers, or society generally.
Similarly, a snap removal defendant's success in minimizing liability may add only modestly
to the wealth of the defendant or its shareholders while causing socio-economic harm to victims of
defective products, negligent acts or breach of contract due to the reduced levels of success and
compensation in federal court. Alternatively, of course, it may be that state courts overcompensate
both deserving and undeserving victims, which also damages society.
Answering or even significantly exploring this question is beyond the scope of this article but
should prompt policymakers to at least be concerned about the variance in preference for forums.
A major rationale of the Erie Doctrine was that cases should not be subject to different outcomes
depending on whether they are litigated in state or federal courts. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). But if despite uniform law cases are coming out sufficiently differently in
state and federal court as to prompt snap removal and similar tactics, it may be time to address and
perhaps correct the discrepancy.

"In Delaughder v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 360 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2018), the
plaintiffs filed their complaint at 11:50 a.m., plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted service at 12:26
p.m., and defendants filed their notice of removal in the federal district court at 1:15 p.m. Defendants
knew this case was coming because an earlier action

which had also been snap-removed

was

voluntarily dismissed without prejudice (on permission of the federal court). Although the trial court
later remanded this "Flash Boys"-style snap removal, other plaintiffs in similar situations have been
less fortunate.
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the courthouse rather than race and remove prior to plaintiff's service upon
the forum state defendant, even though plaintiff has not been slothful in
seeking service.
In these cases, where removal is not as rapid as in the FlashBoys scenario,
the plaintiffs are of course a bit less sympathetic. They could perhaps have
made more diligent efforts at service contemporaneous to filing or have
structured service of process to ensure that forum defendants are the first
defendants served. Though a trap for the unwary, one can criticize plaintiffs'
counsel for falling into it. 85 But even if plaintiffs are not as conscientious (and
adversarial-cum-paranoid) about service matters as they should be, snap
removal of a case that should never have been in federal court seems an
inordinate price to pay.
Plaintiff may also have telegraphed its punch by alerting defendants to
the coming suit or they have been constructively warned because of
settlement overtures. Here, we think there should be some sympathy for
plaintiffs beaten to the removal "punch." Although fans of tricky, cloak-anddagger lawyering may prefer quick strike lawsuits that prevent or at least
discourage snap removal, the public policy favoring informal dispute
resolution and its attendant consensual nature and conservation of resources
would presumably auger in favor of talking settlement before suit even at the
risk of forewarning an opponent and losing the element of surprise in
litigation. At the very least, it would seem inapt for plaintiffs seeking
informal settlement prior to litigation to be punished via snap removal.
In addition to the perhaps expected capacity of sophisticated litigants to
race to the courthouse, the particular service protocols of some states delay
service and expand defendant removal opportunities. Some states, perhaps
most prominently New York and New Jersey, require a plaintiff commencing
a civil action by court filing to obtain a civil action number prior to serving
the defendants.8 6 This often requires several days, particularly if a complaint

85After

having become familiar with the problem through our research, we would advise

plaintiff's counsel to give the same attention to the structure, means, and ordering of service of
process as is devoted to higher profile endeavors such as initial case evaluation, complaint drafting,
and motion practice.
86

See, e.g., N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:5A-2 (requiring issuance of a "Track Assignment Notice" by the

clerk of court before plaintiff may serve a filed complaint upon a defendant; clerk has ten-day
deadline for issuing notice); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304, 306-a (providing that after filing of summons and
complaint and payment of filing fee, clerk of court must issue an "index number" to plaintiff before
process may be served); PA. R. CIv. P. 400(a) (providing that "original process shall be served
within the Commonwealth only by the sheriff' who has 30 days in which to effect service).
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is filed on a Thursday or Friday because the clerks' offices will not be
assigning numbers over a weekend.
In these situations, even the most diligent plaintiff wishing to remain in
state court and ready to do so with expeditious service on a forum state
defendant is effectively precluded from winning the race to the courthouse.
Although one might advise plaintiff counsel in these states to file on a
Monday, this would hardly permit plaintiffs to have a reasonable chance of
effecting service prior to removal. Even a half-day wait for assignment of a
case number from the clerk's office leaves plaintiffs in the dust of snap
removers. 87
Conversely, states that commence litigation with service rather than court
filing (e.g., Minnesota) 88 effectively eliminate the practice of snap removal
so long as the plaintiff makes sure to serve the forum defendant first or
contemporaneously with service upon non-forum defendants. 89 In addition,
state protocols for service, including "long-arm" jurisdictional service, may
decrease plaintiff's odds of resisting snap removal. 90
Procedurally, decisions about the propriety of snap removal emerge when
the trial court rules on a motion to remand after the defendant has already
accomplished the removal, which does not require court consent. 91 Remand,
however, requires a court order and thus becomes the first (and often the
only) reflective judicial evaluation of the snap removal maneuver. 92

87This

might be a good time to ask why in the world a clerk's office operating in the 215L

Century is not able to provide plaintiffs with a case tracking number immediately upon filing of the
complaint. Government bureaucracy already has a bad enough name without becoming an
instrument whereby one class of litigants takes advantage of another group of litigants. But even
this mythical well-run clerk's office instantaneously assigning case numbers would probably not be
fast enough to thwart the best equipped snap removers.
88 See MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01, 4.04 (action commenced by service on defendant).
89

Here again is an area where some of the problem may well be of plaintiff's counsel's own

making. In a state like Minnesota, attorneys seeking to sue in state court and stay in state court
would presumably have a standing rule that its process servers will always serve a forum defendant
first. But failure to adopt these or similar practices should not in our view justify permitting removal
of a case that, according to the purpose of diversity jurisdiction and removal, should not be tried in
federal court.

90

For example, a long-arm statute may provide for service via mailing sent through the

secretary of state or similar officer. If a state requires filing prior to service as well, there regularly
will be a several-day gap between the time of filing and the time of service

more than enough time

to effect pre-service snap removal.

91 See Tex. Brine Co., v. Am. Arb. Ass'n., 955 F.3d 482,485 (5th Cir. 2020).
92
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 107.151; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 76-77.
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E. The Strange Career of Snap Removal
As discussed above, the 1948 Amendment to the removal statute added
the "properly joined and served" language. But it took roughly three decades
before forum state defendants found that they could potentially exploit the
language, in large part by exploiting electronic docket monitoring that gave
defendants with sufficient resources (and fear of being sued in state court) 93
the ability to run to the courthouse with a removal petition faster than even a
diligent plaintiff could effect service after filing a complaint in state court. 94
Because the "forum defendant rule applies only at the time the notice of
removal is filed"95 the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) can be read to

"We do not want to be indifferent to the practical problems faced by American businesses.
Even a well-run organization providing valuable, even lifesaving, goods and services is going to be
sued. The entire industry of commercial general liability insurance is premised on this reality. See
generally Randy Maniloff & Jeffrey Stempel, GEN. LIABILITY INS. COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES IN
EVERY ST. Ch. 1 (41h ed. 2018); Jeffrey W. Stempel & Erik S. Knutsen, STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON
INS. COVERAGE Ch. 14 (4 h ed. 2016).
And as entities seeking to maximize shareholder value, we understand that businesses (or their
liability insurers that will eventually defend claims and pay settlements and judgments) would rather
pay less than more. Consequently, moving from state courts viewed as pro-plaintiff to federal courts
viewed as pro-defendant is understandable.
Nonetheless, if one moves beyond a narrow legal, tactical analysis, one might ask what it means
that some companies are such magnets for lawsuits that it is worth the expense of docket monitoring
and having lawyers on retainer for seeking removal with a speed normally reserved for Jimmy
John's sandwich delivery. Unless in-house counsel is hiring the docket-monitoring company as a
favor for a friend or getting kickbacks, this means the company is getting sued often enough to
establish a snap removal infrastructure. Although this might provide support for pro-defendant
critics of a "litigation explosion," it could also mean that the defendant has become a lawsuit magnet
by frequently doing things wrong. Perhaps federal court adjudication is not providing sufficient
deterrence and should not be fostered by judicial friendliness to snap removal.
9

As discussed further in our data analysis, some snap removals do not have to be particularly

snappy to succeed because plaintiffs are not always swiftly effecting service. In some cases, for
reasons that bewilder us, plaintiffs are downright slow in effecting service

something that should

never happen if a plaintiff is serious about remaining in state court. In this subset of snap removal
cases, we acknowledge plaintiffs are far less sympathetic than in cases where docket monitoring
and removal within an hour beats a diligent plaintiff's service later in the day or within the same
week that the complaint was filed. In slow service cases, snap removal does not have the same
degree of tricky gamesmanship in which a defendant with substantial resources takes advantage of
plaintiff's fewer resources. However, snap removal is equally inappropriate in these cases so long
as the sloth of slow service does not reflect improper, unjustified suit against the forum defendant
merely for procedural advantages. Yet, rather than permitting snap removal, we would prefer that
such cases be addressed pursuant to improper joinder doctrine.

"MOORE ET AL., supra note 20,

§ 107.55[2] at

107-108.
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permit removal prior to joinder and service of the forum state defendant. As
noted in a leading treatise, "[t]he actual language of the forum defendant rule
would seem to permit such removal" but "that literal interpretation would
enable gamesmanship by defendants who, by monitoring the state docket and
removing actions to federal court before the plaintiff has a chance to serve
the forum defendant, could always avoid the rule." 96 Consequently, the
conventional wisdom prior to the traction snap removal has gained in recent
years was "to apply the forum defendant rule even when the forum defendant
has not yet been served." 97
Prior to 1990, defendant efforts to remove prior to service were rare. 98
The tactic was first touched upon in passing by an appellate court in 2001.99
Beginning in 2007, snap removal efforts began to increase, undoubtedly in
significant part because of the increased availability of real time electronic
docket monitoring that permitted defendants in many states to realize they
had been sued prior to being served.
Snap removal was initially met with resistance by many trial courts that
took the position that the "and served" requirement did not change the basic
rule that the presence of a forum state defendant destroyed complete diversity
and prevented removal. 100 As noted above, one leading treatise describes

96Id

97

See id. at 108 n.12 (citing as an exemplar and accurate collection of precedent); Ethington v.

General Electric Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860-64 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (collecting cases and following
Treatise's perceived trend of "prohibiting removal by unserved forum defendant").
98

See Nannery,

supra note 7; Recognition Commc'ns, Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass'n., No.

3:97CV0945, 1998 WL 119528, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
99
See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Tex. Brine Co., v. Am.
Arb. Ass'n., 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing McCall as implicitly earliest federal circuit

court discussion in which "[t]he Sixth Circuit in a footnote also interpreted Section 1441(b)(2) to
allow snap removal"). Because the McCall footnote is so cursory, we are reluctant to treat it as a
considered discussion of the topic. In our view, snap removal did not receive serious appellate court
examination until 2018. See infra text and accompanying notes 114-38 (discussing three federal
appeals court decisions that have assessed permissibility of snap removal).

100

See, e.g., Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218-23

(M.D. Tenn. 2017) (remanding after analysis concluding that snap removal is contrary to
congressional intent and larger purpose of forum defendant rule); Confer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb

Co., 61 F. Supp. 3d 305, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (remanding after removal by non-forum defendant
prior to service on forum defendant); Lone Mountain Ranch, LLC v. Santa Fe Gold Corp., 988 F.

Supp. 2d 1263, 1266-67 (D. N.M. 2013) (noting division of authority but remanding, finding that
forum defendant rule cannot be circumvented by snap removal unless there is fraudulent joinder of
forum defendant or plaintiff was "dilatory" in failing to accomplish service); Perez v. Forest Labs.,
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remand of snap removals to be the majority rule and trend. 101 However, a
substantial number of trial courts have taken a "plain language" approach to
the service requirement and ruled that removal was proper if effected before
service upon forum state defendants.10 2
In a forthcoming article we describe the evolution of the case law from
1991 forward. Although there are no dramatic trends or spikes over this
thirty-year period, the removal rate for snap removals was consistently above
50% nationwide for the years through 2013. The nationwide removal rate
then stayed below 50% through 2018. And it has since returned to rates above
50% again. Although the district courts were roughly evenly divided on the
issue, district courts in the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits are now bound
by precedent. 103
It was not until fall 2018 that an appellate court discussed the propriety
of snap removal at any length. 104 This was followed by a spring 2019
appellate decision, 105 and a spring 2020 panel decision. 106 These three
decisions took a highly textualist approach supporting snap removal, 107

arguably shifting the tide-regrettably in our view (on both substantive and
jurisprudential grounds)-in favor of snap removal. In the absence of
countervailing appellate precedent in the near future, this shift may become
established doctrine. However, the circumstances, rationale and outcome of

Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1242-46 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding snap removal inconsistent with basic
purposes of removal and forum defendant rule); Ethington, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 860-64 (finding snap
removal to frustrate congressional intent); Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (stating that snap removal "frustrates the consistent efforts of both Congress and the courts
to determine diversity jurisdiction based on the genuine interest of the parties to the controversy").
10 1

See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20, § 107.55[2].
e.g., Graff v. Leslie Hindman Auctioneers, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 3d 928, 934-38 (N.D. Ill.
2017); Regal Stone Ltd. v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127-29 (N.D. Cal.
2012); Watanabe v. Lankford, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1219 (D. Haw. 2010); North v. Precision
Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
102 See,

03

See Thomas

O.

Main et. al., The Elastics of Snap Removal: An Empirical Cases Study of

Textualism, 69 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors and

available on SSRN).
104
See Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d 147, 152-54 (3d Cir. 2018).
105
See Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Co., 919 F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 2019) (involving drug product
liability claims; underlying substantive law issues unclear) (decided in March 2019).
106

See Tex. Brine Co., v. Am. Arb. Ass'n., 955 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020).

107

See infra text and accompanying notes 114-24 (discussing Encompass Ins.); infra text and

accompanying notes 125-28 (discussing Gibbons); infra text and accompanying notes 129-38
(discussing Tex. Brine Co.).
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the circuit court decisions to date provide a weak read for supporting snap
removal.
II.

UNFORTUNATE APPELLATE APPROVAL OF A TAINTED TACTIC

A. The Stone Mansion Litigation: Following Text; Permitting
Trickery; Soft-Pedaling History and Legislative Intent
In Encompass Insurance v. Stone Mansion Restaurant, Inc., 108 the Third

Circuit became the first appellate court to gain wide attention ruling on the
propriety of snap removal. The case arose out of a single vehicle rollover that
killed the intoxicated driver and seriously injured his sole passenger as they
were leaving an event at Stone Mansion, a Pittsburgh restaurant.109 The
decedent driver (Brian Viviani) was intoxicated, having consumed
substantial amounts of alcohol at the event.110 The passenger (Helen Hoey)
sued the driver's estate, which tendered defense of the matter to Encompass,
the insurer of the vehicle, which paid $600,000 for a settlement that included
a release of "her claims against all possible defendants." 111
Encompass, an Illinois citizen, then sought recovery in Pennsylvania state
court against Stone Mansion, a Pennsylvania corporation asserting a variety
of claims based on Pennsylvania law, most prominently a dram shop
action,12 and one for contribution by a joint tortfeasor pursuant to
Pennsylvania's version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act

("UCATA").11 3
This is a classic example of a case that does not belong in federal court
because of the forum defendant rule, the action was nonetheless successfully
removed when Stone Mansion took advantage of a miscue by Encompass's

108902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying Pennsylvania substantive law).
19
Id.
"o Id.

I Id.
1 12

at 149.

Dram shop laws, found in more than 40 states, make commercial servers of alcohol (and

sometimes social hosts as well) liable for serving excessive amounts of alcohol to impaired patrons
who subsequently cause injury. Some states, like Pennsylvania, permit an action only by victims of
the intoxicated driver. The bulk of states, however, permit actions by the patron as well. See
generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Making Liquor Immunity Worse: Nevada's Undue Protection of
Commercial Hosts Evicting Vulnerable and Dangerous Patrons, 14 NEV. L. J. 866, 871 (2014).
113 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT

§ 4 (AM. LAW

REPS. 2020). UCATA

generally provides, as does Pennsylvania's adoption of the model law, a methodology for
apportioning the respective liability of tortfeasors.
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counsel, which notified the restaurant of its intent to sue. "In email
correspondence between counsel for Encompass and for Stone Mansion,
counsel for Stone Mansion agreed to accept electronic service of process
instead of requiring formal service." 11 4 This form of service was routine
under Pennsylvania state practice and procedure. After receipt of the
complaint, Stone Mansion counsel then refrained from accepting service and
instead sought removal." 5 Thus, according to both the district and circuit
courts "Stone Mansion timely removed the matter" prior to service. 1 6
Although it had not exactly raced to the courthouse after constant
monitoring of the docket in the manner of a pharmaceutical company, Stone
Mansion had achieved a slow-rolling snap removal (a "sag" removal?) by
essentially conning plaintiff counsel into letting down its guard and forgoing
immediate personal service.1 1 7 The trial court denied the Encompass motion

for remand and ruled for Stone Mansion on the merits via a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.118 Although the case was reversed and remanded on other grounds,

114 Stone

Mansion, 902 F.3d at 150.

"15Id.

16Id
"?See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (describing process for waiver of service of process to "avoid
unnecessary expenses of serving the summons" and providing that plaintiff may notify a defendant
"that an action has been commenced and requires that the defendant waive service of as summons").
In addition to being a good litigation citizen, the waiving defendant need not answer for sixty days
as compared to the twenty-day deadline for answering a complaint served via summons. In addition,
the defendant is provided "a reasonable time of at least [thirty] days after the request was sent . .
to return the waiver." See id. at 4(d)(1)(F).
The waiver of service provisions in Rule 4 were promulgated in 1993 and reflect not only the
modern legal system's encouragement of cooperation and efficiency but also strongly suggest that
snap removal is inconsistent with modern service of process rules. If the federal rule makers
involved in the creation of Rule 4(d)

the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, a Standing Committee

on Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the U.S. Supreme
Court

had been aware of the prospect of pre-service removal by a forum defendant, it is unlikely

they would have issued a service of process rule that could so easily be exploited to achieve such
removal and evade the forum defendant rule. This makes the Stone Mansion panel's lack of outrage
at the conduct of defense counsel all the more puzzling.

"'Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 150; Encompass Ins. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., No.
17CV0125, 2017 WL 664318, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2017), rev 'd, 902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018).
The trial court found as a matter of law that Encompass, standing in the shoes of the intoxicated
patron driver, could not recover under the Pennsylvania Dram Shop law, which recognized only
claims by those injured by an intoxicated patron and not the patrons themselves:
The plain, unambiguous reading of [the dram shop law] indicates that a licensee, such as
Stone Mansion, is liable only to third persons (Hoey in this case), for damages inflicted
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the district court's allowance of snap removal was affirmed by the Third
Circuit. 119
Regarding the propriety of snap removal, the Third Circuit affirmed the
trial court view - and followed the trial court's heavily textualist approach in
spite of defense counsel's clever-cum-deceitful lulling of plaintiff counsel
into complacency regarding prompt service of process. The panel was
"unconvinced that Stone Mansion's conduct - even if unsavory - precludes
it from arguing that incomplete service permits removal."12 0

upon the third person - off the licensee's premises - by a customer of the licensee
([intoxicated driver] Viviani in this case), but only when the licensee furnishes that
customer (Viviani) with alcohol when he was visibly intoxicated. [The law], with its
limited scope, indicates that Stone Mansion may have been liable to Hoey

depending

upon whether Stone Mansion served Viviani alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated.
Encompass'[s] Complaint establishes that Encompass is acting as if it were Viviani in
order to recover under Pennsylvania's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
Because

[there]

is no potential cognizable

claim under

[the

law]

as between

Viviani/Encompass and Stone Mansion, there is likewise no claim for contribution, and
thus, Stone Mansion's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

See id. at *15-16.
"1Stone Mansion, 902 F.3d at 151. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case on the
issue of tortfeasor contribution. Id. at 154-56. But that is not relevant here.
12 0

Id. at 154. The trial court characterized Encompass as arguing that Stone Mansion was

"precluded" from seeking snap removal because of its conduct regarding promised voluntary
acceptance of service. Id.
The use of preclusion terminology, which can cause confusion regarding exactly what is meant
(e.g., claim preclusion; issue preclusion; some kindred doctrine; a layperson's understanding that
certain conduct or statements logically should preclude one from taking inconsistent positions or
saying inconsistent things) and may reflect problematic lawyering by Encompass counsel more than
mischaracterization by the trial court. It clearly appears to us that Encompass was asserting equitable
estoppel based on purportedly reasonable detrimental reliance on Stone Mansion's assurances as
well as a type of unclean hands argument based on purported misconduct by Stone Mansion counsel.
Had this issue been properly recognized by the four judges hearing the case (presumably with
some help by plaintiff's counsel), a more enlightened discussion may have ensued. Instead, the
Third Circuit, while stating it was "mindful" of professional conduct rules prohibiting lawyers from
"engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" (quoting PA. R.

PROF. CONDUCT R. 8.4 that is modeled on ABA R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 8.4), the court rather
cavalierly declared that it "need not pass judgment on whether Stone Mansion violated this rule,
because Encompass has failed to provide any support for the proposition that Stone Mansion's
conduct carried preclusive effect," introducing uncertainty as to whether the Court (with some
misleading "help" from Encompass) was applying the rather strict standards of collateral estoppel
to the issue rather than the more apt and more easily satisfied elements of equitable estoppel (a
misleading statement or conduct inducing reasonable detrimental reliance). See id.
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With Stone Mansion deemed incompletely served/unserved, the appellate
panel applied the literal language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2):
Where federal jurisdiction is premised only on diversity of
the parties, the forum defendant rule applies. That rule
provides that "[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on
the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] may not be removed if
any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought." [citing the statute].
When interpreting a statute, we "must begin with the
statutory text" [as] "[i]t is well-established that '[w]here the
text of a statute is unambiguous, the statute should be
enforced as written and only the most extraordinary showing
of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a
departure from the language.' Nevertheless, it is also a
"basic tenet of statutory construction . .. that courts should
interpret a law to avoid absurd or bizarre results." An absurd
interpretation is one that "defies rationality or renders the
statute nonsensical and superfluous."
Starting with the text, we conclude that the language of
the forum defendant rule in [S]ection 1441(b)(2) is
unambiguous. Its plain meaning precludes removal on the
basis of in-state citizenship only when the defendant has
been properly joined and served. Thus, it remains for us to
determine whether there has been a "most extraordinary
showing of contrary intentions" and consider whether this
literal interpretation leads to "absurd or bizarre results."
The Third Circuit panel did examine the legislative history of the
"properly joined and served" statutory language but did so in relatively
cursory fashion:
Section 1441 exists in part to prevent favoritism for in-state
litigants and discrimination against out-of-state litigants.
The specific purpose of the "properly joined and served"
language in the forum defendant rule is less obvious. The
legislative history provides no guidance; however, courts
12 1

d. at 152 (citations omitted).
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and commentators have determined that Congress enacted
the rule "to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by
joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does
not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve."12
Rejecting Encompass's argument that plaintiff gamesmanship in naming
what might be termed sham or "Potemkin""' defendants is best addressed as
a matter of fraudulent joinder doctrine, the Circuit panel found that Congress'
inclusion of the phrase "properly joined and served" addresses the problem
of fraudulent joinder "with a bright-line rule" that deserved literal
enforcement:
Permitting removal on the facts of this case does not
contravene the apparent purpose to prohibit that particular
tactic. Our interpretation does not defy rationality or render
the statue nonsensical or superfluous, because: (1) it abides
by the plain meaning of the text; (2) it envisions a broader
right of removal only in the narrow circumstances where a
defendant is aware of an action prior to service of process
with sufficient time to initiate removal; and (3) it protects the
statute's goal without rendering any of the language
unnecessary. [While] this result may be peculiar in that it

122

Id. at 153 (citations omitted). See Hellman et al., supra note 68, at 108 (viewing history of

removal statute and joinder and service requirement in this manner). Despite agreeing with the
article's legislative history assessment, which was also shared by a notable trial court decision
within the Circuit that rejected snap removal, see Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp.2d
640, 645 (D.N.J. 2008), the Stone Mansion court did not consider the interpretative principle
positing that where Congress amends a statute without express discussion of a change in the law
as took place with the 1948 and 2011 amendments of the removal statutes-courts should be
reluctant to read new statutory verbiage too broadly and thereby alter a status quo that Congress did
not intend to change.
123

The term "Potemkin Village," is so named for Grigory Potemkin, a Russian minister who

purportedly used the tactic of false building facades designed to convince Catherine the Great that
her newly acquired lands were settled and prosperous rather than barren or war-ravaged. Today, the
term is used to mean a deception designed to make a situation look better or more genuine than its
reality.

See

Potemkin

Village,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/Potenkin%20village (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) ("[A]n impressive fagade
or show designed to hide an undesirable fact or condition."); NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A

HISTORY 658 (2010); see also United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 n.25 (D. Mass.
2011) ("The affidavit is the Potemkin Village of today's litigation landscape. Purported adjudication
by affidavit is like walking down a street between two movie sets, all lawyer-painted fagade and no
interior architecture.").
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allows Stone Mansion to use pre-service machinations to
remove a case that it otherwise could not . . . the outcome is
not so outlandish as to constitute an absurd or bizarre
result. 12

B. Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb: Similar Refusal to Recognize
the Flaws of Snap Removal
Less than six months after Stone Mansion, defendants seeking snap
removal gained another supportive appellate decision in Gibbons v. BristolMyers Squibb Co." Plaintiff Catherine Gibbons sued drug makers Bristol-

124 Stone

Mansion, 902 F.3d at 153-154 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). For the reasons

set forth at TAN 203-203, infra, we find this analysis sorely lacking.
Although absent in the Third Circuit opinion, the trial court's textualism considered Pennsylvania's
Statutory Construction Act regarding the state's dram shop law. See Encompass Ins. v. Stone

Mansion Rest., Inc., No. 17CV0125, 2017 WL 664318, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2017), rev'd, 902
F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018), which provides that:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is
not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly
may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
The trial court did not apply this state Act in its Section 1441(b)(2) analysis, presumably
because it believed it inept to use state law in construing a federal statute. Even though there is not
a general federal law of statutory construction, there is ample precedent, albeit in our view
contradictory precedent with often incorrect analysis.
125919 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2019).
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Myers and Pfizer over alleged defects and dangers posed by Eliquis
(apixaban), a "blood-thinning medication used to reduce the risk of stroke in
patients with atrial fibrillation." 126
Oversimplifying the involved procedural history of the claims, we note
that Defendants Bristol-Myers and Pfizer are both citizens of Delaware by
virtue of their incorporation. After some initial lack of success, counsel with
new plaintiffs filed in Delaware state court, where the matters were quickly
removed by defendants prior to service and transferred to an MDL action in
the Southern District of New York where plaintiffs sought remand to
Delaware state court. The trial court denied the motion in what the circuit
court described as a pattern of "exemplar" work by the trial judge. 127
Addressing the snap removal question, the Second Circuit panel observed
that:

126

The appellate panel betrayed perhaps a more than a little skepticism about the merits of the

claims, which may have affected its snap removal analysis, one largely consistent with Stone
Mansion but perhaps more conclusory or cursory (or "streamlined" for those who approve of the

result):
As might be expected, Eliquis increases patients' risk of bleeding. To that end, the drug,
which was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 2012, carries warnings
about the risk of serious, and possibly fatal, bleeding events.

Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 702.
A discussion of the adequacy of prescription drug testing, regulatory approval, adequacy of
warnings, and direct-to-the-consumer advertising (not permitted in other industrial nations) is of
course beyond the scope of this paper and a topic on which reasonable persons can disagree. But
we find it a bit disconcerting that the appellate panel seems so immediately adverse to the merits of
this drug product liability claim when merely tasked with deciding the procedural issue of removal.
That said, large scale complex litigation subject to MDL consolidation may present the most
sympathetic case for snap removal to the extent it represents defendant desire to remove (by
whatever means necessary) in order to seek consolidation and case administration efficiency rather
than merely a more favorable forum in spite of the lack of risk of prejudice against the forum state
defendant.
127

Id. at 703-04. And to be fair to the four judges who embraced snap removal in Gibbons and

its related cases, one can easily describe the tactics of plaintiff counsel as rivalling or surpassing
any gamesmanship performed by defendants seeking snap removal. In addition, as stated in the
previous note, the Eliquis claims appeared to face substantive problems of preemption by federal
regulation and general weakness under the substantive law in which useful pharmaceutical products
are generally subject to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1975),
which provides both a "learned intermediary" defense (prescription by a physician notwithstanding
that company advertising may have prompted the initial patient inquiry) and a cost-benefit defense
because with the benefits of most drugs inevitably come side effects for some portion of the patients.
See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 456

(2d ed. 2015).
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[g]enerally, any civil suit initiated in state court over which
a district court would have had original jurisdiction "may be
removed by . . . the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district . .. embracing the place where
such action is pending." . . . But where, as here, the only
basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction is diversity of
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, "the forum defendant
rule applies." [citing Stone Mansion]. Under that rule, which
is set out at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), a suit that is "otherwise
removable solely on the basis of . .. [diversity of citizenship]
may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought."
In the usual case, application of the forum defendant rule
is straightforward: a defendant is sued in a diversity action
in the state courts of its home state, is served in accordance
with state law, attempts to remove the case, and is rebuffed
by a district court applying Section 1441(b)(2). Here,
however, Defendants removed each of the Transferred
Actions to federal court after the suit was filed in state court
but before any Defendant was served. The district court,
reasoning from the text of the statute, concluded that such
removal was proper. Other district courts in this Circuit have
reached the opposite conclusion. Nevertheless, in resolving
this split among district courts, we agree with the district
court here that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) is no barrier to the
removal of the Transferred Actions.
"Every exercise in statutory construction must begin
with the words of the text." As the Third Circuit-the only
other Court of Appeals to address the propriety of preservice removal by a defendant sued in its home staterecognized in [Stone Mansion], "the language of the forum
defendant rule in Section 1441(b)(2) is unambiguous." The
statute plainly provides that an action may not be removed
to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship once
a home-state defendant has been "properly joined and
served." By its text, then, Section 1441(b)(2) is inapplicable
until a home-state defendant has been served in accordance
with state law; until then, a state court lawsuit is removable
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under Section 1441(a) so long as a federal district court can
assume jurisdiction over the action.
In fact, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that the
text of Section 1441(b)(2) supports their position. Instead,
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should depart from the plain
meaning of Section 1441(b)(2) because applying the text of
the statute (1) produces an absurd result and (2) will lead to
non-uniform application of the removal statute depending on
the provisions of state law. Neither argument is persuasive.
"It is, to be sure, well-established that '[a] statute should
be interpreted in a way that avoids absurd results."' That
being said, a statute is not "absurd" merely because it
produces results that a court or litigant finds anomalous or
perhaps unwise. To the contrary, courts should look beyond
a statute's text under the canon against absurdity "only
'where the result of applying the plain language would be, in
a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that
Congress could have intended the result and where the
alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most
anyone.
Plaintiffs argue that applying the plain text of Section
1441(b)(2) produces an absurd result in light of the
overarching purpose of the removal statute, which is to allow
an out-of-state defendant to escape prejudice in the state
courts of the plaintiff's home state by ensuring that a fair
federal tribunal is available. In light of this broad purpose,
Plaintiffs frame the forum defendant rule as a carve-out,
premised on the understanding that defendants are unlikely
to be "home-towned" in their home state's courts. Plaintiffs
then explain the inclusion of the phrase "properlyjoined and
served" as Congress's further recognition that crafty
plaintiffs might take advantage of the forum defendant rule
to secure a state-court trial by naming an unnecessary homestate defendant against which they did not intend to proceed.
Thus, Plaintiffs assert that it is absurd to allow a home-state
defendant to use an exception meant to protect defendants
from unfair bias (in the courts of a plaintiff's home state) and
language designed to shield them from gamesmanship (in
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the form of fraudulent joinder) to remove a lawsuit to federal
court.

Plaintiffs are, of course, correct about the general
purposes of the removal statute. But while it might seem
anomalous to permit a defendant sued in its home state to
remove a diversity action, the language of the statute cannot
be simply brushed aside. Allowing a defendant that has not
been served to remove a lawsuit to federal court "does not
contravene" Congress's intent to combat fraudulent joinder.
In fact, Congress may well have adopted the "properly
joined and served" requirement in an attempt to both limit
gamesmanship and provide a bright-line rule keyed on
service, which is clearly more easily administered than a
fact-specific inquiry into a plaintiff's intent or opportunity to
actually serve a home-state defendant. Absurdity, then,
cannot justify a departure from the plain text of the statute.

-

Plaintiffs also urge us to look past the language of Section
1441(b)(2) to avoid "non-uniform application" of the forum
defendant rule based on the vagaries of state law service
requirements. Plaintiffs are correct that allowing home-state
defendants to remove on the basis of diversity before they
are served might mean that defendants sued in some statesthose that require a delay between filing and service, like
Delaware-will be able to remove diversity actions to
federal court while defendants sued in others-those that
permit a plaintiff to serve an action as soon as it is filed
will not. But state-by-state variation is not uncommon in
federal litigation, including in the removal context, and it
does not follow from the existence of variation that we must
look beyond the plain text of Section 1441(b)(2).
Put simply, the result here - that a home-state defendant
may in limited circumstances remove actions filed in state
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship - is authorized
by the text of Section 1441(b)(2) and is neither absurd nor
fundamentally unfair. We therefore have no reason to depart
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from the statute's express language and must affirm the
district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motions to remand. 128

C. Texas Brine: More Textual Literalismand A Tolerancefor the
Absurd
In April 2020, the Fifth Circuit joined the Second and Third Circuits in
permitting snap removal. Like Stone Mansion and Gibbons, Tex. Brine Co.,

v. Am. Arb. Ass'n. 129 took a strongly literal and textualist approach to the
"joined and served" language of 28 U.S.C. @ 1441(b)(2). Plaintiff's
substantive legal case was not particularly compelling, 130 and it had (to us)
inexplicably elected to serve the AAA (a New York citizen) prior to serving
either of the two forum defendants in its Louisiana state court action. 131

128Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 704-07 (citations omitted).
129955 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2020).
"'At least not under the prevailing law of immunity for arbitrators, although the underlying
facts appear sympathetic to Texas Brine. It commenced AAA arbitration proceedings in a contract
dispute with one of its suppliers. Two of the arbitrators were later discovered to have what Texas
Brine regarded as conflicts of interest that should have been disclosed prior to their selection.
Although AAA initially refused to replace the arbitrators, one of the arbitrators was later removed
for cause and the remainder of the panel resigned in the face of continued protest by Texas Brine.

See Tex. Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 484.
The arbitration proceedings were subsequently vacated, with Texas Brine then seeking
reimbursement - from AAA and the two allegedly conflicted non-disclosing arbitrators - for its
arbitration expenses in a Louisiana state court action involving Louisiana plaintiff Texas Brine, New
York-based defendant AAA, and the two Louisiana arbitrators.
In addition to losing its battle to keep the case in state court, discussed in text, Texas Brine lost
on the merits when the trial and appellate courts rules that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.

§§

1-16, provided the exclusive remedy for complaints regarding arbitration proceedings and that

the Act did not permit claims for damages against individual arbitrators or the AAA tribunal. The
Fifth Circuit tribunal viewed the litigation as an impermissible collateral attack on the arbitration in
that it alleged grounds that would if proven also justify vacatur. See Tex. Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 490;
see also Hall St. Assocs., v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008). The trial court also found that
the two allegedly conflicted arbitrators enjoyed immunity similar to that of a judge, but the Fifth
Circuit declined to address this issue. See Tex. Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 490.
131
See id. at 484. In retrospect, this can only be viewed as a serious mistake. Although hindsight
is predictably 20-20, the error is difficult to understand and dilutes sympathy one might otherwise
have for a company allegedly wronged by a defective arbitral proceeding. Although Texas Brine's
Louisiana state court action was filed in July 2018 - prior to the Third Circuit's Stone Mansion
decision and the Second Circuit's Gibbons decision - Louisiana federal district courts had by 2018
already consistently permitted snap removal. See Thomas

O.

Main et al., The Elastics of Snap

Removal: Empirically Assessing a Troublesome Judicial Divide (2019) (manuscript Oct. 2019)
(empirical examination of decisions regarding snap removal and remand; finding more than a dozen
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Consequently, AAA's removal was not the FlashBoys scenario seen in cases
like the Second Circuit's Gibbons and cases involving drugmakers and other
product liability defendants. AAA did not dash to the courthouse. Texas
Brine allowed it to stroll in removing the case to federal court.13 2
Texas Brine then sought remand but was rebuffed by both the trial court
and a unanimous Fifth Circuit panel, which took a strong textualist approach
that, like other decisions permitting snap removal, did not find the results
sufficiently odd or incompatible with the forum defendant rule to qualify as
sufficiently absurd to overcome the literal language of the statute. The panel
noted that the issue was one of first impression in that circuit133 but that:
Two other circuits have recently interpreted Section
1441(b)(2) as allowing snap removal [citing Gibbons and
Stone Mansion]. *** [Further,]

"[W]hen the plain language of a statute is unambiguous
and does not lead to an absurd result, our inquiry begins and
ends with the plain meaning of that language." We look for
both plain meaning and absurdity. By Section 1441(b)(2)'s
terms, this case would not have been removable had the
forum defendants been "properly joined and served" at the
[Allegedly conflicted arbitrator
time of removal.
Defendants] and forum state citizens] Minyard and DiLeo

Louisiana federal trial court cases permitting snap removal). See, e.g., Leech v. 3M Co., 278 F.

Supp. 3d 933, 941 (E.D. La. 2017) (taking plain language approach to 28 U.S.C.

§

14419(b)(2)

similar to that of Texas Brine panel).
132 Although

the facts of Texas Brine can be distinguished from snap removal stemming from

high-tech docket monitoring and high-speed removal petitions, the decision nonetheless gives a
green light to such efforts and has attracted the attention of defense counsel ready to take advantage
of the new precedent. See Brittany Wakim, 5th Cir. Attys Should Be Ready to Filefor Removal in

A Snap, LAw360, https://www.law360.com/articles/1263519/5th-circ-attys-should-be-ready-tofile-for-removal-in-a-snap (April 14, 2020) ("What does this mean for practitioners? In terms of
best practice, defendants should continue to monitor state court dockets and quickly file notices of
removal in cases prior to service of a forum defendant. Where litigation is anticipated, it may be
beneficial for a defendant to have removal papers, or at least advanced shell removal papers,
prepared for anticipated jurisdictions that are read to be filed . .. a few hours could make the
difference in whether the [snap] removal" is successful").
133

The panel also took the view, as have most courts, that "the forum-defendant rule is a

procedural rule and not a jurisdictional one". See Tex. Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 485 (citing In re 1994

Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2009)). See TAN 239, infra (discussing treatment
of the forum defendant rule as a jurisdictional requirement akin to complete diversity as solution to
snap removal problem).
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had not been served, though. When the AAA filed its notice
of removal, the case was "otherwise removable" - as
required by Section 1441(b) - because the district court has
original jurisdiction of a case initially filed in Louisiana state
court in which the parties are diverse. § 1441(a); § 1332(a).
The forum-defendant rule's procedural barrier to removal
was irrelevant because the only defendant "properly joined
and served," the AAA, was not a citizen of Louisiana, the
forum state. See § 1441(b)(2). We agree with a comment
made by the Second Circuit: "By its text, then, Section
1441(b)(2) is inapplicable until a home-state defendant has
been served in accordance with state law; until then, a state
court lawsuit is removable under Section 1441(a) so long as
a federal district court can assume jurisdiction over the
action."
Texas Brine accepts that the statute's plain language
allows snap removal. It argues, though, that such a result is
absurd and defeats Congress's intent. Texas Brine asserts
that Congress added the "properly joined and served"
language to Section 1441(b)(2) to prevent plaintiffs from
naming forum defendants merely for the purpose of
destroying diversity. That purpose is not served here because
Texas Brine intended to pursue its claims against the forum
defendants. The AAA counters that there is no meaningful
legislative history of the "properly joined and served"
language, even if we were inclined to consider such history.
Further, Congress did not revise that language when it
amended Section 1441(b)(2) in 2011 even after some snap
removals had occurred.
In statutory interpretation, an absurdity is not mere
oddity. The absurdity bar is high, as it should be. The result
must be preposterous, one that "no reasonable person could
intend." ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 237 (2012). In our view of reasonableness, snap
removal is at least rational. Even if we believed that there
was a "drafter's failure to appreciate the effect of certain
provisions," such a flaw by itself does not constitute an
absurdity. SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 238. We are not
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the final editors of statutes, modifying language when we
perceive some oversight. The Second and Third Circuits
rejected the same absurdity argument in upholding snap
removal. The Second Circuit believed there was more than
one sensible reason for the language "properly joined and
served":
Congress may well have adopted the "properly
joined and served" requirement in an attempt to both
limit gamesmanship and provide a bright-line rule
keyed on service, which is clearly more easily
administered than a fact-specific inquiry into a
plaintiff's intent or opportunity to actually serve a
home-state defendant.
Gibbons, 919 F.3d at 706. In other words, a reasonable
person could intend the results of the plain language. The
Third Circuit also found that the result was not absurd
because the interpretation gives meaning to each word and
abides by the plain language. Encompass, 902 F.3d at 153.
Of some importance, the removing party is not a forum
defendant. Diversity jurisdiction and removal exist to protect
out-of-state defendants from in-state prejudices. The plainlanguage reading of the forum-defendant rule as applied in
this case does not justify a court's attempt to revise the
statute. 134
III.

THE INDEFENSIBILITY OF SNAP REMOVAL

Although snap removal has its judicial1 3 5 and academic 136 defenders, we

join those critical of the practice. 13 7 Longstanding norms in American law
1

"See Tex. Brine Co., 955 F.3d at 486-87 (citations other than to Gibbons and Stone Mansion

removed; capitalization in original; emphasis added).
15
1 See TAN 88-101, supra (discussing trial court decisions permitting snap removal) and 102125, supra (discussing Second, Third and Fifth Circuit decisions permitting snap removal).
136 See, e.g., Zach Hughes, A New Argument Supporting Removal of Diversity Cases Prior to
Service, 79 DEF. COUNS. J. 205 (2012); Saurabh Bishnubhakat, Pre-Service Removal in the Forum

Defendant's Arsenal, 47 GONZ. L. REv. 147 (2011).
117 See, e.g., Fiskus v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 14 Civ. 3931, 2014 WL 4953610, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014); Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D.N.J.
2008); Nannery, supra note 7; Jordan Bailey, Comment, Giving State Courts the

0l' Slip:

Should a
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have posited that (a) federal jurisdiction is limited and should be strictly
construed; (b) diversity jurisdiction creates tension for the nation's federalist
ideals and should be particularly narrowly construed as reflected in the
complete diversity requirement; (c) removal poses an even greater threat to
federalism because it divests a state court of jurisdiction, and therefore
requires an even narrower construction accompanied by strict and particular
technical requirements if removal is to be effected; (d) the presence of even
a single forum state defendant sufficiently negates the local prejudice
rationale for diversity jurisdiction to prevent removal; (e) procedure should
advance substantive law and policy objectives rather than undermining them
through gamesmanship; and (f) litigation outcomes should not vary
according to the respective wealth, resources, or status of the parties. Absent
undue plaintiff sloth in effecting service or a showing that a non-culpable or
immune defendant has been named solely for defeating federal jurisdiction,
removal should not be permitted in cases involving a forum state defendant
simply because a removal petition preceded service on that defendant.

A. Slouching Toward Absurdity: Excessive Textualist Literalism and
the Advantages of InterpretativePluralismand Purposivism
To be sure, the literal language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) supports snap
removal by restricting removal only "if none of the defendants properly
joined and served" is a forum defendant. We argue, as others have, that the
language produces an "absurd" result. But decisions allowing snap removal
are all the more galling when issued under the valence of textualism's virtue,
which is deference to Congress. To be clear, courts permitting snap removal
have actually (if not also deliberately) undermined Congressional
understanding of a well-established structure of relations between federal and
state courts. Although the term "served" has a seemingly clear technical
meaning in the law, it also seems clear that Congress in 1948 was using the
word to convey a concept (non-sham joinder) rather than an inflexible
requirement of the forum defendant rule.

Defendant be Allowed to Remove an Otherwise Irremovable Case to FederalCourt Solely Because

Removal was Made Before Any Defendant is Served?, 42 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 181 (2009). Although
not as appalled as we and some others are by snap removal, Arthur Hellman, et al., supra note 68,
is sufficiently concerned about snap removal as to propose a statutory amendment negating snap
removal if a forum state defendant is served within 30 days of the removal. See also Debra Lyn

Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2006).
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In construing and applying a rule or statute, courts should attempt to
implement the intent of the rulemakers or legislators and the purpose of the
positive law in question. 138 Unfortunately, the good common sense of that
venerable approach sometimes gives way to an overly blinkered, formalist
textualism that emphasizes particular verbiage at the expense of the
objectives of lawmakers. Even strongly textualist courts implicitly concede
that a literal application of the language of statute, rule, or contract can
sometimes lead to error in that all have an "absurd result" exception to
applying "plain language."
Absurdity, of course, is in the eye of the beholder. Case reports and law
review articles reflect profound differences of opinion on the topic.
Conceptually, some regard an "absurd" result only as something horrific or
utterly devoid of rational basis while others find something absurd when it is
sufficiently unwise, strained, or inconsistent with the overall objective of a
statute, rule, contract, custom or practice.
We have a moderate working definition of absurdity. An interpretation or
application of law brings an "absurd" result when it is blatantly inconsistent
with the overall objective of the law. Unlike the courts that have rejected
"absurd result" analysis in permitting snap removal, we do not think the
outcome of literal application of text needs to be ludicrously dysfunctional in
order to qualify as sufficiently absurd to permit consideration of drafting
history, drafter intent, statutory purpose, and the structure and function of the
law in question.
Indeed, we believe all these factors should routinely be considered by
courts as they read the language of a statute or rule rather than reading the
text in isolation and then considering these other powerful indicia of meaning
only when the text is regarded as either facially ambiguous or producing a
result so ridiculous that it can be regarded as absurd without any
consideration of context.
Courts permitting snap removal, including the three circuit courts to
approve the practice, have argued with some sophistication that snap removal
is not flat-out absurd because it can be defended as a clear but perhaps crude
means of enforcing a policy against improper joinder motivated only by
attempts to sue in state court.
Although this argument is more defensible than snap removal itself, it in
our view sets the absurdity bar too high as means of construing problematic

"'Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1221-23 (M.D. Tenn.
2017).

SNAP REMOVAL

2020]

469

-

statutory language. One can articulate reasons literal enforcement of the
service requirement is helpful in discouraging gamesmanship by plaintiffs
but this does not negate that literal enforcement of the service requirement in
turn encourages gamesmanship by defendants as well as creating a large
exception to the forum defendant rule even though there is not a shred of
evidence that Congress has ever sought to alter that long-standing feature of
American litigation. If the "one" who is articulating the reasons to justify the
literal reading of a statute is not Congress nor even someone Congressadjacent, then there is reason at least for pause. Indeed, if one finds oneself
doing a somersault, one should ask for whom they are performing.
Although we remain functionalist and contextualist rather than textualist,
a page of textualism supports our position. Textualists, in their quest for
determining the "plain meaning" of statutory language, frequently rely on
dictionaries. A popular definition of "absurd" is "ridiculously unreasonable,
unsound, or incongruous." 139 Synonyms for "absurd" include: "foolish,"
"silly," and "no showing of good sense." 1 40 Further, the term absurd is used
"when something is not in keeping with common sense, good reasoning, or
accepted ideas," with the term foolish used "when something is not thought
of by others as wise or sensible." 14 1
Use of the word absurd "stresses a lack of logical sense or harmonious
agreement, of parts (such as a premise and a conclusion) not fitting
together." 142 Thus, by one definitional concept of absurdity, a construction of

13 9

Absurd, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/absurd#synony

ms (visited Sept. 2, 2019).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142

Id. Other sources provide definitions of "absurd" that are more extreme and thus supportive

of those arguing that snap removal, though admittedly odd and at odds with the history of federal
jurisdiction,

is
not
flat-out
absurd.
See,
e.g.,
Absurd,
VOCABULARY.COM,
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/absurd (visited Sept. 12, 2020) ("[s]omething absurd is
really silly, absolutely ridiculous, or total nonsense. Thinking you can wear flip flops and a bikini
to

the
North
Pole
is
an
absurd
idea.)";
Absurd,
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/absurd?s=t (visited Sept. 12, 2020) (something is absurd if it is
"utterly or obviously senseless, illogical, or untrue; contrary to all reason or common sense;

laughably foolish or false").
While these more extreme concepts of what it means to be absurd provide to very limited use
of the absurd result exception to plain language statutory construction, they also illustrate a major
problem with textualism (or at least the type of acontextual textualism that requires an absurd result
as a pre-condition to departing from literalism). There are many dictionaries and usually multiple
accepted definitions of a term, synonyms for a term, and connotative values of a term. In addition,
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statutory language that is inconsistent with the intent of the legislature, the
purpose of the statute, or the overall structure of the area of law in question
could be deemed "absurd." Using this or related concepts of absurdity, a
sizeable number of trial courts have found snap removal to be absurd.143
But, at the risk of a bad anti-textualist pun, where is it "written" that
statutory language must be applied literally unless the result is absurd? Why
is it not sufficient that literal application of the text be at odds with factors
such as legislative intent, statutory purpose, statutory function, role of the
statute in the legal fabric, or other structural aspects of the legal system? Our
view is that something considerably less than absurdity should counsel
against a literalist application of problematic statutory language.
Textualist courts, however, set their rhetorical table by citing precedent
stating that the "plain" or "clear" language of a statute controls unless the
result is absurd, citing cases stressing statutory text or declaring that if text is
facially clear, no further inquiry or resort to extrinsic sources is permitted. 144
A milder form of this textualist approach posits that "[w]here the text of a
statute is unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written and only the
most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history
will justify a departure from that language."145
This approach makes it hard - too hard in our view - to displace even
unintended or unwise application of statutory language. First, it begs the
question of when documentary text is "unambiguous." While courts taking
this view undoubtedly mean the text is plain on its two-dimensional, paper
and ink face, this very determination requires some imbedded assumptions
about the nature of the statute and the usage of words. "Chair" means one
thing when furniture shopping, another when holding a meeting, another

dictionaries change over time but textualists appear not to have coalesced around norm for use of
different dictionary editions and time period. One can make a strong case that the relevant
dictionaries

regarding

the

meaning

of a word

in a statute are

only those dictionaries

contemporaneous with the legislation. Does this also mean that the definition of what is an "absurd"
result should also be based on the understanding of the time when a statue was enacted or amended?

143See, e.g., Fiskus v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 14 Civ. 3931, 2014 WL 4953610, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014); Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D.N.J.
2008).
144 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling, 81 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa 1957) ("resort may be
had to rules of construction only where the language of an instrument is of doubtful meaning");

Mautner v. Peralta, 215 Cal. App. 3d 796, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("ambiguity ordinarily is a
condition precedent to statutory interpretation.").

14 5

McMaster v. E. Armored Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted),
cited in Encompass Ins., v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018).
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when making academic appointments, and another when discussing capital
punishment.
Textualist judges seldom make explicit the context and perspective from
which they are determining whether a word is clear or unclear. Sometimes
the context is obvious from the situation but not always. The judge's
conscious or unconscious associations with a word, enterprise, or
government activity are almost never apparent to the outside world. This
makes a case for less judicial jumping to conclusions about linguistic
meaning and more express examination of factors other than text that inform
the meaning of the text.
Second, it is not clear what constitutes an "extraordinary" showing of
contrary legislative intent. Is context enough? Individual legislator floor
statements? Committee reports? Hearing testimony? Contemporaneous news
accounts of the problem to be "solved" by the legislation in question?
Third, the focus on legislative history alone needlessly limits the amount
of information that courts may use in statutory construction. The background
of the legislation might shed more light on the goals of the act than more
official legislative history. But "moderate" textualists willing to allow
powerful legislative history to impact construction of statutory verbiage want
to limit the inquiry to only formal legislative history, which seems to us
unduly narrow.
Fourth, this approach also begs the question - examined more fully below
- as to why text is given such disproportionate weight relative to legislative
intent and statutory purpose. Strong textualism has been enjoying a roughly
40-year reign that roughly coincides with Antonin Scalia's ascension to the
Supreme Court. 146 But this is a relatively recent development. For many
decades, legislative intent was the touchstone of statutory construction. 147
14 6

No doubt owing not only to his prominence and power as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice but

also his extensive intellectual entrepreneurship. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (promoting textualism and use of
canons of construction, both textual and substantive, as preferred to examination of legislative

history); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1176 (1989)
(promoting formalist methodology as well as textualism).
147

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621 (1990)

(describing U.S. Supreme Court's "traditional approach" prior to the Scalia Era as willingness "to
consider virtually any contextual evidence, especially the statute's legislative history, even though
the statutory text has an apparent 'plain meaning."'); A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most
Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1071 (1988)
(reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1st. ed. 1988) (noting variant approaches to statutory interpretation);
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And in centuries past, purposivism held sway, with a leading precedent
instructing courts to "suppress the mischief and advance the remedy" in
construing statutes. 14 Using this venerable approach would almost certainly
lead the majority of courts to disapprove snap removal.
While there is no shortage of cases making textualist pronouncements,
this approach ignores the many cases149 - and extensive scholarly
commentary1 50 - that stress the importance of legislative intent, statutory
purpose, system functionality, and public policy.
Courts favoring snap removal have to some degree "cherry-picked"
precedents in order to embrace rather muscular textualism when they would

William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6
CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 801-02 (1985) (finding that prevailing views regarding proper approach to
statutory interpretation vary by era and that, for example,
while first half of

20

19

'h Century emphasized legislative intent

'h Century gave greater emphasis to statutory purpose of the "equity of the

statute"). See also Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Championfor Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The
United States in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 111, 130 (1997) (describing modern Supreme
Court interpretation only a few years after Eskridge's New Textualism article as reflecting "fetish
for textualism").
148

Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584) (describing judiciary's task of statutory

interpretation as to "suppress the mischief' that prompted the statute and "advance the remedy"
sought by the legislature).
14

1See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383 (1991) (focusing on central purpose of

statute as much or more than text, an approach described as backwards by Justice Scalia in ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW 16-17 (2012); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 491
U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (reflecting concern over legislative intent and purpose); Holy Trinity Church
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (stressing that "spirit" or purpose of the statute may be
at odds with literal language and deciding case based on purpose). Holy Trinity Church has in some
quarters acquired a bad name because of its nativist "Christian Nation" rhetoric used in the course
of ruling that a New York City Episcopal church's importation of an English minister did not violate
labor and immigration laws. But the opinion's commitment to purposivism strikes us as perfectly
politically correct. See generally Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity Church:

Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000) (extensive
examination of decision and its background generally approving of its methodology despite
arguable reflected animus toward laborers lacking Anglican pedigree).
150 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES

AND THE CONSTITUTION

(2016);

WILLIAM D. POPKIN, THE JUDICIAL ROLE:

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL PARTNER (2013); WILLIAM D.
POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1999);

WILLIAM N.

ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

(1994);

GUIDO

CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); William D. Popkin, An
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation,76 MINN. L. REv. 1133,

1142 (1992); William N. Eskridge & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 326 (1990).
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be equally free to focus on less textualist precedents. Although there may be
some situations when adherence to a particularly textualist literalism is
compelled by precedent, we think these comparatively rare.
For example, U.S. Supreme Court decisions of course stress the
importance of statutory language - but they also stress the importance of
other interpretative factors.151 The modern Court's interpretative continuum
ranges from the late Justice Scalia (who at times deemed all legislative
history irrelevant)152 to Justice Breyer (who views legislative history as
important and highly indicative/determinative of statutory meaning).153
A full critique of textualism, of which there are many,15 1 is beyond the
scope of this article. The problem of snap removal is to a large degree a
jurisprudential problem concerning the apt approach to statutory language.
Courts permitting snap removal take a highly textualist approach and are
unmoved by results that are "merely" inconsistent with legislative intent,
history, statutory purpose, or the larger policy objectives of the law. 155
Courts remanding snap removal cases take a more contextual and
functional approach, assessing multiple interpretative factors and concluding
that it is unlikely that Congress, when adding the service language to the
removal statute in 1948 intended to abolish the forum defendant rule in cases
where defendants were clever enough and well-staffed enough to win races
to the courthouse. 156

Courts that follow the textualist route to snap removal pay a high price
for the mechanical simplicity of that approach. The casualties-seldom if
ever recognized-are the history of diversity jurisdiction and removal, the
15 1

See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION AND

REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY Ch. 5 (6th ed. 2020) (reviewing
historical and current theories of statutory interpretation, citing cases and secondary authority).
152See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER,

supra note 136; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF

INTERPRETATION (1997); Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 136.
153 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.

CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992). See also Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of
Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin Supreme Courts, 80

MARQ. L. REv. 161 (1995).
154See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read the FederalistBut Not

Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998); Eskridge, The New
Textualism, supra note 147.

e.g., Regal Stone Ltd. v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127-29 (N.D.
Cal. 2012); North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
156
See, e.g., Little v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1218-23
(M.D. Tenn. 2017); Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F.Supp.2d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
155See,
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purpose of diversity jurisdiction and removal, the longstanding adherence to
the forum defendant rule, and the public policy consensus that the removal
route to federal court should be strictly construed and generally not open in
cases where one of the defendants is a forum state citizen.
In denying remand in Flash Boys style snap removal cases, courts
unnecessarily privilege textualism and formalism (arriving at the courthouse
prior to removal) over fairness and regard for substantive policy (the forum
defendant rule) in favor of form. Worse yet, some courts, including one of
the three circuit court panels addressing snap removal, have denied remand
even where adversarial cleverness spilled over into outright deception.15 7
At a minimum, opinions permitting snap removal suffer from an
overarching failure to think about the purpose of not only isolated language
but an entire statutory scheme and the judicial system as well as the public
policy and history underlying the forum defendant rule and the structure of
federal jurisdiction.
The basic interpretative error in cases permitting snap removal cases is a
brittle and formal brand of textualism that masquerades as neutral and simple.
Courts permitting snap removal are doing something considerably more than
simply giving words their seeming natural meaning. They are reading the
language not just literally but out of context and without regard for other
legitimate interpretative factors.
The root of this interpretative error is a radical form of textualism that
regards only the text of a statute as "law." The philosophical and
jurisprudential underpinnings of this view have never been particularly
clearly articulated, much less (in our view) persuasively articulated. The
argument, so far as we can discern, is that only the statutory text is actually
enacted by Congress in a bill signed by the President. Consequently,
surrounding information - the context of the legislation - is not "the law" and
should not be considered.
The proposition is incorrect. Language has meaning only in context - not
only the context of surrounding language in the same document but also the
context giving rise to a document or law: the status quo; the perceived
problems or opportunities that prompted legislation; the facts known to the
drafters; the goals of the drafters and the purpose of the legislation; their
understanding of the likely application of the language and the place of the
legislation in the overall fabric of the law.

17

1

See TAN 108-124, supra (discussing Third Circuit's Stone Mansion decision).
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Staring incessantly at a few words of the statute (e.g., "and served")
without using this other information to determine the proper application of
the particular words and the statute as a whole strikes us as folly. And from
this folly flows the error of allowing wording that was unproblematic in 1948
to morph into a purported plain meaning edict allowing litigation
maneuvering completely at odds with the statute in question as well as the
larger federal court system. 158

If important extra-textual public policies are considered, the costs of the
narrow textualism permitting snap removal becomes apparent. When snap
removal is permitted, the history, rationale, structure and function of
federalism, diversity jurisdiction and removal is given short shrift. While one
can reasonably question the rationale of the forum defendant rule (i.e., that a
single in-state defendant removes risk of local bias or prejudice), it has,
whatever shortcomings of its rationale, long been the accepted rule.
Circumvention of the rule cannot be justified by the weak read of the words
"and served" added to Section 1441(b)(2) seventy years ago when no one but
perhaps science fiction authors could have imagined current technology.
In addition, permitting snap removal undermines public policy favoring
federalism and plaintiff forum choice is severely undermined and inequality
of resources is exacerbated. Comparatively wealthy defendants are provided
another procedural weapon while comparatively impoverished plaintiffs are
partially disarmed. The consequences of this implicit favoritism toward
defendants is exacerbated by the current composition of the federal bench,

158 Snap removal, despite its tension with or destruction of the forum defendant rule, could be

defended as sufficiently beneficial because of efficiency concerns. Snap removal - which can be
done in ultimate FlashBoys style by large pharmaceutical or chemical companies subject to frequent
and related litigation - may foster consolidation. Once in federal court, such litigation is more easily
subject to MDL (multi-district litigation; see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407) or related consolidation

that is more

difficult where similar cases are strewn through 50 state court systems as well as 94 federal district
courts.
Or at least this is one possible defense of snap removal, albeit one that we have not seen in the
defense bar literature, which seems to regard it as a given that federal courts are more favorable to
defendants and should be reached whenever possible by whatever means necessary.
This justification, though not absurd, is not in our view persuasive. More important, it appears
not to account for much snap removal practice by defendants. See Thomas

O.

Main et al., supra

note 103 (finding comparatively few instances of snap removal in cases subject to MDL
proceedings). To be sure, drugmakers, manufacturers, and insurers have pursued snap removal. But
it appears they have done so primarily in individual cases and have made no overt effort to promote
snap removal as a means of placing more cases in federal court in order to foster consolidation,
streamlined pretrial procedure, effective case management, or global settlement.
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which has become significantly more pro-defendant than most of its state
court counterparts.
Further, there appears to be no social gain from snap removal - unless
one believes that state courts are overly generous to plaintiffs or unfair to
defendants. That's possible of course. But available evidence regarding win/
loss rates and damage awards suggests that state-federal divergence is not
one of excessive state court largess but rather considerably more prodefendant federal court outcomes that have created a conventional wisdom
in the defense bar counseling escape from state courts whenever possible. 159
Snap removal thus adds more time and expense to litigation (with the
convenient effect for defendants in that it imposes burdens on plaintiff
counsel who is probably not getting hourly compensation in return) without
discernible social benefit. 160
In addition, snap removal based on textual literalism cannot be justified
on the assumption that Congress will take corrective action if it disagrees. A
crowded legislative agenda, partisan infighting, interest group influence, and
an array of diversions of the calendar (e.g., elections, pandemics,
impeachment) all combine to produce legislative gridlock and reduce the
realistic chance of swift congressional correction of decisions regarded as
erroneous, particularly if the issue is not salient to layperson voters.
Regarding snap removal, the most influential observers (plaintiff counsel.
defense counsel, and commercial clients) are divided, making swift
legislative correction unlikely.
B. Legislative History Augurs Against Snap Removal
Although there is not much documentation of congressional intent
underlying the 1948 language change that introduced the service requirement
to the forum defendant rule, there is certainly nothing to suggest that
Congress intended to eliminate or significantly curtail the rule.
On the contrary, available evidence suggests that Congress was perfectly
happy with the forum defendant rule. 161 Congress did not wish in 1948 to
change the rule but rather only to prevent it from being misused by plaintiffs

1

'See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,83 CORNELL L. REv. 581,593 (1998)
(noting overall plaintiff win rate of 58 percent for cases initially filed in federal court compared to
win rate of only 37 percent for removed cases).
16 0
161

See Nannery, supra note 7, at 568-70.
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 577, 588 (1982).
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naming sham forum state defendants in their complaints as a means of
defeating removal.
Under these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to interpret the
language added in 1948 as an expansion of removal. For similar reasons, it
seems inappropriate to construe lack of revision of the removal statute by
Congress - in the 2011 amendments or in any congressional session - as
congressional endorsement of snap removal or even acquiescence to it.
One school of statutory interpretation commonly associated with the late
Justice John Paul Stevens treats congressional silence or inaction as an
indication that Congress intends no significant change in the law.162 If it had,
it would have made more noise. Sometimes, perhaps even often, it is
significant that the "dog didn't bark": a reference to a Sherlock Holmes story
in which a prize horse is stolen without the family dog barking at the thief.
Holmes correctly deduces that the dog failed to bark because the thief was
someone known to the animal. 163
This common sense maxim augurs in favor of limiting the "joined and
served" language of Section 1441(b)(2) to situations where a forum
defendant is named but not seriously pursued by plaintiff or clearly cannot

162 See,

e.g., Martinez v. Ct. of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 159 (2000) ("negative historical evidence"

or absence of evidence of intent to effect significant change, is relevant to issues of legislative intent
in manner similar to relevance of dog failing to bark during theft); Griffin, 458 U.S. at 577, 588
(1982) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (joined by Blackman, J.) ("unremarkable" type of revision to statute
without commentary in legislative history suggests absence of congressional intent to effect
significant change in the law; "the fact that the dog did not bark can itself be significant") (citing

Harrison v. PPG Indust., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602) (1980)) (opinion of Justice Rehnquist using this
analogy but declining to follow it in that case); but see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,406 (1991)

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy, J.) (assuming that dogs will bark
when something important is happening is "questionable wisdom" and arguing that the Court has
"forcefully and explicitly rejected the Conan Doyle approach to statutory construction in the past.").
Perhaps Justice Scalia is right about the Court's overall attitude toward this tool for assessing
legislative activity. There are only a few Supreme Court cases expressly referring to the barking
dog metaphor and this article is not an attempt to ascertain the precise views of individual justices
on the question. But we are sure that Justice Scalia is wrong and that Justice Stevens is correct in
positing that when legislatures are making significant changes in the law by altering language, there
is normally a rather well-developed historical trail in addition to the language change itself. Justice
Scalia's error, in substantial part, stems from his ultra-textualist views that lead him to be relatively
uninterested in congressional intent and purpose and in the legislative process itself since the late
Justice thought these irrelevant or even illegitimate as interpretative tools.
163

See A. CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE IN THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 383 (1938)
(cited by Justice Stevens in Martinez, 528 U.S. at 159 (2000) and in Grffin, 458 U.S. at 577 (1982)
(Stevens, J. dissenting)).
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be liable as a matter of law. So long as defendant's joinder is not clearly futile
or a sham, the "and served" language should not be a tail that wags the larger
dog of the forum defendant limitation on removal.
If Congress had wanted the "and served" language to have such a large
impact on removal practice by creating an entirely new genre of snap
removal, it likely would have made this clear somewhere in the hearing
testimony, committee reports, floor statements, or contemporaneous
accounts of the legislation. Congresspersons regularly promote their
activities to the press and reporters regularly seek information about the
intent, purpose, goals, and planned impact of legislation. If there was any
congressional desire to have 1948's new service provisions overturn the basic
forum defendant rule, one would expect to find at least some "barking" to
that effect. But there appears to be no - not a shred - of such evidence
supporting snap removal.
For that reason, courts err if they treat the 1948 addition of the service
language too literally and in derogation of the basic forum defendant
limitation on removal. Congress's failure to correct the error in the 2011
amendments to the removal statute arguably presents a closer question but on
balance it appears the 2011 revision has no bearing on the snap removal issue.
As one commentator concluded:
The "properly joined and served" language remains in
[Section] 1441(b)(2) even after the statute was amended in
2011. The removal statute now states that a diversity case
"may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought. The amended statute simply
restates the forum defendant rule in positive rather than
negative terms. There is no evidence in the legislative history
of the 2011 amendment that Congress was concerned with
the interpretation of the word "none," or that Congress
intended to preserve or override any practice under or
interpretation of the forum defendant rule by leaving the
remainder of the provision intact. 16 4

164

See Nannery, supra note 7, at 549 (citations omitted); see also H.R. REP. No. 112-10, at 12

(2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576 (stating that revision to
substance of the . . . current subsection.").

§

1441(b) merely "restates the
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But by 2011, there was a substantial group of snap removal decisions,
many of them giving literal reading to the "and served" language and
permitting snap removal. 165 One could argue that Congress was
presumptively aware of those decisions and that Congress would amend
Section 1441(b)(2) to legislatively overrule them if it disagreed. But
Congress did not change the service language even though it was already
addressing removal. Proponents of snap removal construe this as tacit
approval of a literalist construction of Section 1441(b)(2) and of snap
removal. 166
This interpretation of the 2011 Amendment is at least problematic and
probably erroneous for a several reasons. First, Congress may not have been
aware of snap removal and almost certainly was not keenly aware of snap
removal. Although scholarly analysis suggests that Congress is surprisingly
well informed about judicial decisions 167 (and thus presumably capable of
responding to them), these studies concentrate on Supreme Court and circuit
court decisions that are logically more visible to congressional staff.
Trial court decisions that tend to evade appellate review, as is the case
with most removal and remand matters, were less likely to register with
Congress during the roughly five years that snap removal opinions were
being rendered in significant number prior to the 2011 Amendments.
Congress may not, in fact, have known about snap removal at all. It was only
in 2019, after two circuit court decisions approving the practice, that the
House of Representatives held hearings on the matter. 168 There is nothing in

165
E.g., Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Ott v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662, 665 (S.D. Miss. 2002); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Maple Leaf Bakery v.
Raychem Corp., No. 99 C 6948, 1999 WL 1101326, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 1999).
166
167

See TAN 104-127, supra (discussing Stone Mansion, Gibbons, and Texas Brine decisions).
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the Inside - An

EmpiricalStudy of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation and the Canons: PartI, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 929 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the Inside -An
EmpiricalStudy of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation and the Canons: PartII, 66 STAN. L. REV.

725, 732 (2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Matthew R. Christiansen, CongressionalOverrides of
Supreme Court StatutoryInterpretationDecisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEx. L. REv. 1317, 1446 (2014);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE
L.J. 331, 343 (1991) (examination of congressional override legislation during 1967-1990 time
period suggests fairly close monitoring of Supreme Court opinions by congressional staff and
particularly interested members).
168
See Examining the Use of "Snap" Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant
Rule,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
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the 2011 legislative history to suggest that Congress consciously decided to
retain the "joined and served" statutory language because it approved or even
tolerated snap removal.
Second, congressional awareness does not equal congressional ability to
address a problem at the juncture in question. The press of other business and
a looming election year might well have prompted the 2011 Congress to
maintain the service language status quo even if it had misgivings about
application of the language in snap removal cases.
Third, Congress may have, in fact, been aware of decisions permitting
snap removal. If so, it was also undoubtedly aware of decisions remanding
such cases and making a less textualist construction of § 1441(b)(2)'s service
language. As of the time of the 2011 Amendment to the removal statute, there
was relatively even division of the trial court cases, and the absence of
appellate precedent.
Under these circumstances, Congress may have preferred to leave the
service language unchanged to give the judicial process time to resolve the
issue. This is an especially likely scenario even if Congress in 2011 was
aware of the issue and concerned about snap removal but not particularly sure
of how to constrain it. Or the 2011 Congress may have been relatively
confident that judicial doctrine would eventually prohibit snap removal.
Although cases like Stone Mansion,169 Gibbons,170 and Texas Brine171 show

any such confidence was misplaced, a rational Congress might very well have
expected a common law evolution against snap removal.
Fourth, there are serious questions about the legitimacy of using the
inaction of a subsequent Congress to shape judicial interpretation of a law
enacted decades before the inactive Congress, just as there would be serious
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Jerry Nadler, ChairmanNadler Statement for Subcomm.
Hearing on "Examining the Use of "Snap" Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule
(Nov.

14,

2019),

https://nadler.house.gov/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394143

("Unfortunately, a combination of modern technology, a desire by some corporations to avoid state
courts seemingly at any cost, and a supposed loophole in the removal statute has engendered a new
tactic [by defendants] . . . [T]his sort of gamesmanship is clearly contrary to the spirit and the intent
of the federal removal statute. This evasion of the well-established forum defendant rule also
threatens state sovereignty and violates federalism principles by denying state courts the ability to
shape state law. State courts should be the final arbiters of state law, but snap removals are
increasingly putting new state-law questions into federal court. This issue may seem obscure, but it

is a growing problem.") (emphasis added).
169902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018).
170919 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 2019).
171955 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2020).
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concern if a court relied on a 2011 congressional floor statement as if it were
contemporaneous legislative history for a 1948 statute. If a subsequent
Congress is to "speak" with authority to the meaning of a statute, it must
actually amend the statute.1 7 2 Although there are circumstances where
"subsequent legislative history" may be relevant, the 2011 amendments to
removal law appear not to be such an instance.
Relatedly, changes in circumstances and changes in the political,
socioeconomic, and ideological composition of Congress may make it
particularly dangerous to use the inaction or statements of a later Congress
as guides to understanding the intent and purpose of a much earlier legislating
Congress. The composition of Congress may well have changed
dramatically. A later Congress of course has the right to change the
legislation of an earlier Congress with which it has come to disagree. But the
later Congress has no authority to change the work of a prior Congress merely
through inaction or criticism of that prior work.
The 1948 Congress that amended the removal statute included a House
of Representatives with 246 Republicans and 188 Democrats (as well as one
Labor Party member) with a Senate of 51 Republicans and 45 Democrats.1 73
The 2011 Congress had 242 Republicans and 193 Democrats in the House,
with 47 Republicans and 51 Democrats in the Senate.1 74 Although this is
relatively consistent partisan alignment of the respective chambers, it of
course fails to account for changes in party ideology and composition as well
as the ideological, public policy and jurisprudential orientation of members
as well as the relative presence or absence of attorneys in Congress.
Although a painstaking examination of the educational background of the
legislators is beyond the scope of this article, our exploratory examination
suggests that the 1948 Congress had proportionately more attorneys (58

1,2 John

C. Grabow, CongressionalSilence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture

into "Speculative Unrealities",64 B.U. L. REv. 737, 746, 749-750 (1984).
13

See Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

content/uploads/ 2019/03/1-20-Full.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2020); Office of Art & Archives,
Congress Profiles, U.S. H.R. (last visited Sept. 22, 2020), https://history.house.gov/CongressionalOverview/Profiles/80th/;

U.S.S., PARTY DIVISION, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm

(last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
174
See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Vital Statistics on Congress, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/ 2019/03/1-20-Full.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
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percent) 175 than Congress in 2011 (42 percent), 176 a comparison that reflects

a long-term trend.177 It stands to reason that a more lawyer-laden legislative
body could be seen as unlikely to undermine the long-standing forum
defendant rule through a two-word provision aimed at sham defendants.
Further, the 2011 Congress, which was nearly half attorneys, was unlikely to
have silently approved of dilution of the forum defendant rule even if its
membership was not as lawyer-laden as its predecessors.
Fifth, treating the 1948 removal amendments as static while attributing
meaning to the absence of change in the 2011 amendments arguably
transposes sound statutory construction theory. Even a traditionalist should
permit some degree of dynamic statutory interpretation in assessing the
service language added in 1948.
At the time of amendment, there were no electronic dockets (and certainly
no electronic docket monitoring software), no internet, no personal
computers, no wi-fi, no mobile phones, and only relatively slow electronic
connections. Even the most prescient of the enactors of the "and served"
language could never have imagined that the language would permit superspeedy snap removal that was fast enough to leapfrog service of process.
One might thus ask what the authors of the 1948 language would have
thought, done, and legislated if they could see into the future. 178 Most likely,
a group that did not like joinder of sham defendants but wished to continue
the venerable forum defendant rule would be appalled at the prospect of its
17 5

Composite Pictureof the Current Congress, 26 CONG. DIG. 183, 184 (1947). This included

244 Representatives and 62 Senators who listed their occupation or training as law divided by the
535-member Congress.
176

A figure derived by dividing the 168 Representatives and 57 Senators who listed their

occupation or training as law (according to Jennifer E. Manning, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE,

Membership of the 112'h Congress: A

Profile (Nov.

26, 2012) available

at

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41647.pdf (last visited at Sept. 23, 2020) by the 535-member
Congress).
1

?? See Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers No Longer Dominate Congress; Is Commercialization

to
Blame?,
A.B.A.J.
(last
visited
at
Sept.
23,
2020,
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers nojlongerdominatecongressiscommerciali
zationof professiontob ("In the mid-19th century, nearly 80 percent of members of Congress
were lawyers . . . The percentage fell to less than 60 percent in the 1960s and less than 40 percent
in 2015."); see also Nick Robinson, The Decline of the Lawyer Politician, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 657,

659 (2017).
17 8

See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation:In the Classroomand In the Courtroom, 50

U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (advocating judicial use of "imaginative reconstruction" of
congressional intent and understanding of impact of legislation were it aware of modern
developments).
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evasion through new technology. Although this approach to statutory
construction is controversial and opposed by originalists, it is at least as
logically legitimate and informative as treating the silence of the 2011
amendments - which said nothing about snap removal - as an endorsement
of snap removal.

C. PermittingSnap Removal Rewards ProblematicBehavior by
Defendants and Counsel
Decisions supporting snap removal also err in that they implicitly approve
of what most people (indeed, most lawyers not on the payroll of a snapremoving defendant) would regard as undue trickiness. 179 The idea that a
defendant can evade the long-standing forum defendant limitation on
removal through use of faster computers and on-call lawyers should strike
reasonable people as too clever by half. The adversarial system of American
litigation envisions vigorous advocacy but should not enshrine sneaky tricks.
As further discussed below, U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding
removal made a strong statement to this effect prior to the advent of the snap
removal era.180
The facilitation of trickery and gaming the system through a literal
application of the service language is also ironic in light of and contradicted
by the history of the service language, which "was intended to prevent
gamesmanship by plaintiffs, who might otherwise name an in-state defendant
against whom there is no valid claim merely to prevent removal by the other
defendants." 181 Consequently, "[a]llowing defendants to rush to remove
newly filed state court cases before the plaintiff has a chance to serve the
forum defendant would turn Congressional intent to prevent litigant
gamesmanship on its head." 1 8 2
Relatively recent Supreme Court precedent is also a brief against attorney
trickery, technicality and sharp practices. In Murphy Brothers v. Michetti

1 9

1 See MOORE ET AL, supra note 20,

§ 107.55

(literal application of "and served" language

would enable "gamesmanship by defendants, who, by monitoring the state docket and removing
actions to federal court before the plaintiff has a chance to serve the forum defendant, could always
avoid the rule.").

18 0
See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344 (1999), discussed at TAN 183194, infra.
181
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20 § 107.55.
182

See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20

§

107.55, citing cases.
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Pipe Stringing,183 plaintiff Michetti's clever lawyers faxed a "courtesy" copy
of a breach of contract complaint to a Murphy executive as a prelude to
settlement discussion. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and Michetti then
sued. Murphy removed the case to federal court 30 days later, which was 44
days after receipt of the faxed courtesy copy. Michetti argued that removal
was untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which provides that "notice
of removal . . . shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the
defendant, thought service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading."1 8 4
The trial court denied Michetti's remand motion, reasoning that the faxed
courtesy copy did not start the 30-day removal clock. 185 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed186 but the Supreme Court found Murphy's removal timely, holding
that informal delivery of a complaint did not qualify as the type of "or
otherwise" delivery that would trigger the removal deadline. 187

D. Supreme Court Removal PrecedentCasts Doubt on Snap Removal
and the Textual Literalism that FacilitatesSnap Removal
The Murphy Brothers court held that a defendant ordinarily was not
obligated to take any action in a lawsuit that had yet to commence. 188 In so
ruling, the Court implicitly rejected the type of textualist literalism used by
today's courts permitting snap removal and took a more functionalist
approach sensitive to the overall purpose, structure and function of the court
system - an approach similar to that of today's courts rejecting snap removal.
The Murphy Brothers Court also looked closely at the 1948 Amendments
to the removal statute that introduced the 30-day deadline 89 - the same 1948
legislation that added the "and served" language even though one could argue
that the words "by service or otherwise" had a plain meaning that eliminated
any need to examine legislative history. This was the interpretative
methodology used by the Eleventh Circuit that the Court rejected.1 90
183526 U.S. 344, 344 (1999).
184
Id. at 348.
1 5
1

Id. at 349.

86

See Michetti Pipe Stringing v. Murphy Bros., 125 F.3d 1396, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd,
526 U.S. 344 (1999).
187
See Murphy Bros, 526 U.S. at 347-348 (1999).
188

See id. at 349-350 ("In the absence of service of process ...

a court ordinarily may not

exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant.").

189

See id. at 351-53.

19 0

See id. at 353; see also id. at 346 (noting that courts have given "receipt through service or

otherwise" language in Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c) functionalist rather than literalist interpretation).
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In words that should inform today's courts addressing snap removal, the
Court approvingly cited a trial court's observation that "If in fact the words
'service or otherwise' had a plain meaning, the cases would not be so
hopelessly split over their proper interpretation."191 The Court further
approved a circuit court opinion taking the position that "'nothing ... would
justify our concluding that the drafters, in their quest for evenhandedness and
promptness in the removal process, intended to abrogate the necessity for
something as fundamental as service of process."'192
Murphy Brothers was also functionalist and pragmatic rather than
textualist in that the Court noted that a literalist approach to the term "or
otherwise" and its attendant starting of the clock upon fax transmission (or
today's even faster and more extensive electronic means) could "operate with
notable unfairness to individuals and entities in foreign nations" because of
the longer time required for service abroad.193
While one must not make too much over a 20-year-old precedent that is
not entirely on all fours with a snap removal case (as well as reflecting a 6-3
split in the Court),194 the parallels are sufficient to place the Murphy Brothers

191

Id. at 353-54 (citing Apache Nitrogen Prods., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D., 674, 679

(D. Ariz. 1993)); see also id. at 354 (reviewing alternative means that defendant might otherwise
receive a complaint that would be consistent with litigation having already been commenced).
192

Id. at 355 (quoting Silva v. Madison, 69 F.3d 1368, 1376 (7th Cir. 1995)).

19 3

Id. at 356. In addition, Murphy Brothers implicitly disapproved of attorney trickery, or at

least was reluctant to reward it. Undoubtedly, Michetti would argue, as it did before the Supreme
Court, that faxing the courtesy copy was not an attempt to start the 30-day clock while lulling
Murphy into complacency. Perhaps, but we have personal experience with attorneys in the preMurphy Brothers era doing exactly that - or at least attempting to - but being thwarted by equally
clever defense counsel recognizing the maneuver or trial courts that, like the Supreme Court in
Murphy Brothers, rejected textual literalism.

194

Dissenting Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas argued that "the Court does little to

explain why the plain language of the statute should not control, opting instead to superimpose a
judicially created service of process requirement . .

" For these reasons set forth herein we are not

persuaded. See id. at 357 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, jointed by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.).
In addition, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of departing "from this Court's practice of
strictly construing removal and similar jurisdictional statutes." Id. To us, this sounds like the

1 3 'h

chime of the clock and correspondingly breeds a lack of confidence in the dissent's analysis. "Strict"
construction of the removal statute or other jurisdictional provisions does not mean literal - and
certainly not broadly literal - interpretation of the words of the statute. When cases, treatise, judges
and lawyers speak of strict construction of subject matter jurisdiction and removal, they normally
mean narrow construction because of the norm that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
which correspondingly requires caution in ripping a matter away from a state's judicial system. The
Murphy Brothers dissent represents in microcosm a significant problem with a purported "plain
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"

precedent on the side of those remanding snap removals. This modern
removal precedent takes an approach like the courts barring snap removal
and rejects the textual literalism of the courts permitting snap removal. 19 5 It
is clear from the dissent, which argued for a textually literalist approach to
the issue, that the Court majority did not merely overlook the "plain
meaning" tact taken by pro-snap removal courts. 196 Rather, Murphy Brothers
consciously rejected this approach, jurisprudential history that has been
unduly overlooked by the three circuit courts permitting snap removal.
At a minimum, Murphy Brothers demands at least some attention from
courts addressing snap removal. But astonishingly, neither the Third Circuit's
Stone Mansion decision 197 nor the Fifth Circuit's Texas Brine1 98 decisions
approving snap removal cited Murphy Brothers, much less discussed it or
reflected on its implications. The Second Circuit's Gibbons decision 199
favoring snap removal cited Murphy Brothers but only regarding the issue of
the existence of state variance in service of process. Gibbons made no attempt
to assess the Supreme Court's statutory construction methodology.2
We find it more than a bit shocking that a relevant Supreme Court
precedent regarding removal was essentially ignored by three circuit courts
dealing for the first time (in their respective courts) with a removal issue that
has divided district courts. Instead, these circuit court panels relied on their
own perceived linguistic competence to the exclusion of other interpretative
factors, including relevant precedent.

meaning" approach. Too often courts professing to be taking this route are unclear or even
wrongheaded about what the degree of breadth and scope to be accorded the allegedly plain text.

1
"See also Recognition Commc'ns, Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass'n, Inc., 3:97-CV-0945-P, 1998
WL 119528, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998); Nannery, supra note 7, at 550 (describing Recognition
Communications as the "first reported instance of the use of the snap removal device"); Robert P.
Faulkner, The Courtesy Copy Trap: Untimely Removal From State to Federal Court, 52 MD. L.

REV. 374, 386 (1993).
&

196
See Murphy Bros, 526 U.S. at 357 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia
Thomas, JJ.).
197
902 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2018), discussed at TAN 114-126, supra.
198955 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2020), discussed at TAN 129-134, supra.
199919 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 2019), discussed at TAN 125-128, supra.
200

See id. at 707.
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E. A FormalistShortcoming of a FormalistTactic: How Can an

Unserved Defendant Have Standing to Remove?
Also surprising to us is that the three appellate panels that have considered
the propriety of snap removal as well as most of the trial courts addressing
the issue have overlooked an arguable elephant in the room - whether an
unserved defendant even has standing to remove prior to service. At the risk
of continued repetition, we again reproduce relevant statutory language.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district
court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending. 20 1
In determining whether a civil action is removable on the
basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title,
the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names
shall be disregarded.20 2
A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) [diversity jurisdiction]
may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in
which such action is brought.2 03
Although there is ample case law providing that a defendant need not be
served in order to pursue removal, 2 14 it is not at all clear that this result is
compelled by the language of the statute. To be sure, the first statutory
reference is only to "defendants" without any requirement of service. But this
oblique reference is not much proof that Congress affirmatively approved of
unserved defendants pursuing removal.

U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added).
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) (emphasis added).
20328 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added).
204 See, e.g., Novak v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 783 F.3d 910, 911 (1st Cir. 2015)
(defendant may remove before service); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 177 (5th Cir. 2000)
20128
20228

(service of process not absolute prerequisite to removal). See MOORE ET AL., supra note 20

§

107.40

("Nothing in the statutes requires the defendant to have been served or to have appeared in state
court before such defendant may remove a case. All the circuits to have decided the issue have held
that the removing defendant need not have been served.") (footnotes omitted).
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One can make an equally compelling argument that one is not really a
defendant until one has been served. If that were not the case, lawyers would
lack of the lengthy list of process serving anecdotes that accompany potential
defendants (or actual defendants depending on one's reading of the rules)
working so hard to duck service. Certainly, an unserved defendant is not at
risk of an adverse judgment and owes nothing to the plaintiff. For example,
a large body of default judgment jurisprudence clearly establishes that
unserved or improperly served defendants are entitled to vacate such
judgments. 20 A reasonable attorney could logically conclude that until a
client has been served, the client not only has no obligation to respond in any
way (by answer, motion, or removal) but may even be precluded from
responding until served.
The same removal statute that uses the unadorned term "defendant" in 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) also provides in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) that the fictitiously
named "Doe" and "Roe" defendants - who are by definition unserved - shall
not be considered in determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction and
eligibility for removal. While one may read the existence of this special
provision as proving that a general reference to a "defendant" does not mean
a served defendant, one may also read this provision as treating unserved,
unidentified parties not yet brought to the litigation as disqualified from
participation in the litigation.
Further, the problematic joined and served" language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)(2), whatever mischief it has caused plaintiffs regarding snap
removal, can be fairly read as suggesting that until a defendant is served, it is
not part of the litigation and that an unserved defendant has nothing from
which to seek removal. 2 06

205

See 2 Stephen Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary R. 55

(2020) (reviewing jurisprudence of FED. R. Cwv. P. 55 regarding default judgments and vacating
default judgments); HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 13

§

13.7 (same); COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 1

at 726-28 (same).
2 06

1n a similar vein, some trial courts have imposed similar technical requirements on snap

removal efforts, even in circuits that have approved snap removal generally. See, e.g., Brown v.

Teva Pharm., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 738, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (case is "removed" only after notice
of the removal is filed and served in state court); Dutton v. Ethicon, Inc., 423 F.Supp.3d 81, 87

(D.N.J. 2019) (same); see also John L. Schweder II & Brian H. Callaway, Winning the Removal
Race: DistrictCourts Put Limits on 'Snap Removal', PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (last visited Sept. 22,
2020),
https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/winning-the-removal-race-district-courts-putlimits-on-snap-removal-2019-12-18;

Steve Boranian, Removed to Federal Court? Not So Fast,
DRUG
& DEVICE LAW BLOG (Sept.
24, 7:00AM),
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/11/removed-to-federal-court-not-so-fast.html.
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It should not be forgotten that removal begins, of course, with a state court
action. And many states provide that, unlike federal lawsuits commenced by
filing, 207 an action is commenced only by effectuated service of process upon
a defendant. 20 Where this is the case, the U.S. Supreme Court has been
extremely solicitous of state requirements mandating service before an action
can proceed.
In the famous Ragan v. Merchant's Transfer & Warehouse Co. 209 case,
the court found that the Erie Doctrine 2 10 compelled obedience to the state
service requirement and found plaintiff's claim untimely even though
plaintiff had commenced the action (for federal court purposes) by filing his
complaint prior to the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. Even
after Hanna v. Plumer"' modified Erie to provide greater deference to onpoint Federal Civil Rules, the Court in Walker v. Armco Steel 212 found that
Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 was not sufficiently on point and reaffirmed that state
service requirements controlled, ejecting from court another plaintiff who
had "beaten" the statute of limitations under Rule 3 but not according to state
service requirements.
The practical takeaway from these decisions is that an unserved party is
not really a defendant as the term is normally understood and is certainly not
a defendant at risk of an adverse judgment anytime soon. Consequently, in
cases where the party seeking snap removal is unserved, that party arguably
lacks standing to seek snap removal. If this construction of the removal
statute held sway, docket-lurking Flash Boys removal would be precluded
even if permitted in cases where plaintiff (perhaps foolishly) makes actual
volitional service upon a non-forum defendant prior to serving a forum
defendant.
Notwithstanding that our analysis of the removal statute runs counter to
a significant body of case law and commentary, there is recent precedent
supporting our analysis. In Felders v. Bairett, the court ruled that a
defendant's Rule 68 offer of judgment was ineffective because it was made
2 07

See FED. R. CIV. P. 3.

208 See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01. In this type of jurisdiction, snap removal is comparatively

rare but not impossible. For example, a plaintiff might effect service on a non-forum defendant, who
then seeks removal before service is effect upon the one or more forum defendants in the litigation.

U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see COLEMAN ET AL, supra note 205 at
193-229 (discussing Erie and implications).
211380 U.S. 460, 470-74 (1965).
212446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980).
209337

210
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prior to becoming a party in the litigation.213 As the court described the
chronology:
Plaintiffs . . . initiated this litigation by filing their complaint
on December 29, 2008 ...
Plaintiffs asserted 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims alleging, among other things, that Defendant
Bairett and other law enforcement officers violated
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights during a traffic stop. In
February 2009, before Plaintiffs served Bairett (or any other
defendant) with a summons and the complaint, Bairett
offered to settle the case by paying the driver, Felders,
$20,000 and passengers Madyun and Hansend $2,500 each.
Bairett's offer, entitled "Defendant's Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment," stated, among other things, that
[i]n accordance with Rule 68, if Plaintiffs do not
accept this offer in writing within ten (10) days after
service [of the offer], the offer shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible
except in a proceeding to determine costs. If
Plaintiffs subsequently obtain a judgment against
these Defendants that is not more favorable than this
offer, Plaintiffs must pay the costs and fees that the
Defendants incur after making of the offer.
Plaintiffs did not accept Bairett's offer. Two months later, in
April 2009, Plaintiffs timely sent Bairett's counsel a request
to waive service of the summons and complaint, which
Bairett's attorney executed ....
Six years later, a jury found Defendant Bairett liable for
unlawfully searching Plaintiffs' car and awarded the driver,
Felders, $15,000, and her two passengers, Madyun and
Hansend, nominal damages of $1 each. After the jury's
verdict, Plaintiffs moved "To Strike and/or Deem Ineffective
Bairett's Alleged 'Offer of Judgment."' The district court
granted that motion, ruling that Bairett's February 2009 offer
to settle the case did not qualify as a Rule 68 offer to allow
judgment against Bairett because he made that settlement

213885 F.3d 646, 649 (10th Cir. 2018).
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offer before he became a party to this litigation. Bairett
appeals that decision. 24
Rule 68 provides that a "party defending against a claim" may serve an
offer of judgment upon an "opposing party." Officer Bairett was obviously
defending against plaintiff's claim but his offer of judgment was deemed
ineffective because he had not been served. According to the Bairett Court:

[t]o be effective, a Rule 68 offer of judgment must be made
after the plaintiff (1) files the complaint with the court and
(2) obtains jurisdiction over the defendant in that litigation
by service of the complaint on that defendant or obtaining
his waiver of service. 215

The court found that eligibility to make a Rule 68 offer required more
than merely being named a defendant in a complaint. 216 Quoting the Supreme
Court's Murphy Brothers opinion, Bairetttook the view that "one becomes a
party officially ... only upon service of a summons or other authorityasserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear
and defend." 217 "Until an entity has been served and is brought into an action
formally, he can do nothing in the action - let alone "defend[] against a
claim." 2 18 "We conclude, then, that the language of Rule 68 dictates that a
defendant must be made a party to the litigation, by service of a summons
and the complaint, or waiver of service, before that defendant can make a

2 14

Id. at 649-50 (citations to record removed).
Id. at 652 (boldface removed).

2 15
216

See

id.

21

1I. (quoting Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Ins., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999)).
Accord, Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that defendants who
were never served "were never made parties" to the action); E.E.O.C. v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty.,

& Mun. Emps., No. 94-CV-1022, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17536, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1996)
(settlement made before entity became party to case not considered a settlement pursuant to Rule

68 offer of judgment); see also Andrews v. Joyce, No. 2:19-CV-833-TS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
212396, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 9, 2019) (following Feldersv. Bairettand holding service a requirement
for exercise of judicial power over a defendant).
21 8

Bairett, 885 F.3d at 653 (brackets the court's); see also4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
§ 1093 at 676 (2015) (defendant not required to answer and

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

defendant until service of process has been made on defendant); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic

Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 116 (1986); 13 MOORE ET AL.,

§ 68.03

(citing Bairett

majority and dissent but no other authority on the issue of whether an unserved defendant may make
Rule 68 effective offer).
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valid Rule 68 offer to allow judgment against him [and potentially shift postoffer costs to the opposing party]."219
The Tenth Circuit's view - that a named defendant in a filed case must
be served before availing itself of procedural options established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure logically applies to procedural options (such
as removal) established by statute. 22 Although one may reasonably debate
the decision in Bairett (as did the dissent 221), its rationale logically requires
defendants to be made a party to a case via service of process before it may
seek removal. If applied to snap removal, the logic of Bairett would forbid
the practice.
We favor the Bairett majority's approach, albeit with acknowledgment
that service may not be required as a condition of eligibility for use of all
procedural devices. Some procedural options may be unduly devalued if they
are only permitted to be used after service. But Rule 68 is not one of them.
When invoking the Rule and making an offer of judgment, the defending
offeror is establishing a framework whereby the coercive power of the court
may later be used to impose penalties on an opposing party that rejected the
Rule 68 settlement offer. In order to enlist the court's coercive power, the
party seeking its benefit should itself be subject to that coercive power.
Removal provides a similar situation in which the right to remove is not
unduly undermined by limiting the right only to those defendants that have
been served. By filing a petition of removal, the removing entity is invoking
the coercive power of the national judicial system to literally rip a case away
from a state court. Although the practice is long standing, it is at least in
tension with traditional American federalism in that it triggers federal court
power over a co-ordinate judicial system. Such power should be subject to
invocation only by a party that has been served and become subject to the
judicial power of the state system that is to be stripped of a case on its docket.

219

Bairett, 885 F.3d at 656. A dissenting judge argued that the majority's construction of Rule

68 was inconsistent with the concept of a "party" to litigation in other contexts such as Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 where defendants argue that a court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the
dispute or the defendant. The dissent further contended that Officer Bairett was as a practical matter
a defendant party once the complaint was filed. See 885 F.3d at 656-59. (Tymkovich, C.J.,
dissenting) ("I would thus hold a named defendant has the power to offer judgment under Rule 68
from the moment the complaint is filed"). Although Judge Tymkovich's position is consistent with
permitting pre-service snap removal it is, of course, a dissenting view.
22 0
22

Bairett, 885 F.3d at 652 (10th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 656 (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting).

1
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At the very least, cases like Bairett suggest that courts permitting snap
removal have been remiss in not at least examining the question of how an
entity that is not even officially part of a case can eject that case from a state
judicial system. Becoming part of the case through service should be the
"price of admission" for seeking removal. Such a requirement would
drastically reduce opportunities for snap removal - a result that emphasizes
the degree to which snap removal is a fissure in the system occasioned by
unintended consequences of drafting and insufficient judicial scrutiny more
than it is an unambiguous command from a Congress that adjourned 70 years
ago.
A "short way" with snap removal222 that would ameliorate some of its
worst excesses would be to simply prohibit its use by an unserved defendant.
Although there would remain some cases where a plaintiff seeking to sue in
state court errs by serving non-forum defendants ahead of forum defendants,
construction of the removal statute akin to the Felders v. Bairett limit on use
of Rule 68 would prevent the most egregious instances of snap removal
gamesmanship.
IV.

RESTORING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND LITIGANT BALANCE
THROUGH MODEST REVISION OF THE REMOVAL STATUTE

A. Our Proposal
Apt use of removal could be restored through a relatively simple
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) that merely deletes the "and served"
language from the statute, thereby eliminating the opportunity for
opportunism by forum state defendants and co-defendants who can file
removal petitions prior to service.
Although there currently exists precedent permitting dismissal of a
"sham" defendant, including sanctions for parties using the tactic, defendants
contend the practice is not sufficiently policed. 23 To accommodate this

222

See Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REv. 388, 388 (1942). We use the

phrase with irony as Professor Radin was a pronounced textualist suspicious of reliance on

legislative history. We disagree. In addition, the case for considering legislative history and context
has gotten stronger over the years as legislatures have become subject to increasing scrutiny, with
their work and its background and context increasingly memorialized in a variety of official and
secondary sources.

3

22

See TAN 77-78, supra (discussing fraudulent joinder doctrine).
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legitimate concern of defendants, we propose that § 1441(b)(2) be amended
as follows:
A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under Section 1332(a) of this title may not be
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and
see as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such
action is brought. If no defendant who is a citizen of the
forum state is served within 120 days of commencement of
the action, removal may be sought within the time period
provided by Section 1446.
This relatively straightforward change would eliminate Flash Boys or
race-to-the-courthouse snap removals as well as forum defendant removal
based on trickery (e.g., refusing to accept service by mail as in Stone
Mansion) or opportunistically taking advantage of insufficiently industrious
plaintiff counsel.
The logical intuition that a defendant unserved after four months is
probably not an important defendant (and certainly not a target defendant) is
made a controlling presumption though use of a hard-and-fast 120-day time
limit for service on the forum state defendant. This time period is long enough
to comfortably account for service delays occasioned by state rules or
custom, the vast bulk of logistical problems that may delay service, and the
practical abilities of defendants to duck service of process.
Critics may be concerned that this fix could potentially allow a partial
return to the status quo that prompted the 1948 Congress to add the service
language to the statute - the risk that a plaintiff would name a forum state
citizen as a defendant solely to defeat removal with no intent of actually
pursuing relief against that defendant. We think this risk is effectively
eliminated by the additional language we propose adding to
Section 1441(b)(2), which requires service on a forum defendant within 120
days if removal is to remain barred for the defendants. In this manner,
opportunities for gamesmanship or sharp practices by either plaintiffs or
defendants is minimized.
B. Other Proposalsof Note

1. The Hellman, et al. Correction by Addition
Other proposals for eliminating snap removal have been advanced. The
most publicized, although capable of alleviating the problem, comes with
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some cost of added complexity and required litigation activity for those
seeking to avoid snap removal.
In a 2016 article noting the problems posed by snap removal, a group of
prominent law professors critical of the tactic proposed amendment to the
removal statute that would (in their words) "neutralize" the tactic of snap
removal" by arming plaintiffs with the following countermeasure that
would be enacted as a new subsection to 28 U.S.C. § 1447225:
(f) Removal before service on forum defendant
-

If

(1) a civil action was removed solely on the basis of
the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this

title, and
(2) at the time of removal, one or more parties in

interest properly joined as defendants were
citizens of the state in which such action was
brought but had not been served, but

(3) after removal was effected, any such defendant
was properly served within the time for service
of process allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court, upon motion filed within
30 days after such service, shall remand the
action to the state court from which it was

removed. 226
Professor Hellman, when subsequently testifying at a congressional
subcommittee hearing, presented a modified version of this "snapback"
proposal that reads as follows:
224

See Arthur Hellman et. al., supra note 68.

225 Professor Hellman has advocated the group's proposal in testimony before the House

Judiciary Committee subcommittee on courts, intellectual property, and the Internet. See Examining
the Use of "Snap" Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of Arthur D.
Hellman, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh School of Law). Coincidently,
Professor Hellman, an obvious critic of snap removal in seeking to legislatively curtail it, was
significantly involved in the 2011 Amendments to the removal statute (see id. at 2-3) something we
regard as further evidence that the 2011 changes should not be read as an implicit ratification of
snap removal.
226

Hellman et al., supra note 68, at 110.
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(f) Removal before service on forum defendant
(1) This subsection shall apply to any case in which
(A) a civil action was removed solely
on the basis of the jurisdiction
under section 1332(a) of this title,
and
(B) at the time of removal, one or more
parties in interest properly joined as
defendants were citizens of the state
in which such action was brought,
but no such defendant had been
properly served.

-

(2) The court shall remand the civil action described
in paragraph (1) to the state court from which it was
removed if
(A) Within 30 days after the filing of
the notice of removal under section
1446(a) or within the time specified
by state law for service of process,
whichever is shorter, a defendant
described in subparagraph (1)(B) is
properly served in the manner
prescribed by state law, and
(B) A motion to remand is made in
accordance with, and within the
time specified by, the first sentence
of subsection (c).117
According to Professor Hellman and his co-authors, enactment of their
proposal will create a situation where "the incidence of snap removal can be
expected to diminish sharply, as defendants come to recognize that the
strategy will no longer enable them to circumvent the forum-defendant

22

, See Arthur D. Hellman, Snapback, Version 2.0: The Best Solution to the Problem of Snap

Removal, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property and the Internet (Nov. 14, 2019, Univ. of Pittsburgh School of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2020-01 (Jan. 2020).
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rule."22 8 In addition, the proposal offers a side benefit in that the "upon
motion" requirement clarifies and confirms that the forum defendant rule is
not jurisdictional, and is therefore waivable and not to be raised by the court
sua sponte.229 Finally, by leaving the existing text of the relevant removal
statutes unchanged, their solution-by-addition likely minimizes the risk of
unintended consequences.
We see the Hellman et al. proposal as having several problems. First, one
might worry that the proposal could have the undesired effect of entrenching
snap removal into the removal scheme. The very presence of proposed
Section 1447(f) might be seen as strengthening the case for the plainlanguage interpretation of Section 1441(b)(2) that gives rise to snap removal
in the first place.
Second, there could be problems in cases where the plaintiff is unable to
serve the forum defendant within the period set by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)
(including as extended by the court). It is not immediately clear what would
happen then. Presumably the federal court would dismiss the unserved
defendant without prejudice. 230 But that would not seem to trigger the
snapback countermeasure. Nor would the snapback countermeasure appear
to be triggered if the plaintiff were to re-file against the forum defendant back
in state court. In that event, the scheme would result in the original action
being split between the state and federal courts.
Third, one might wonder whether defendants will behave as predicted and
stop attempting to invoke snap removal. The tactic will remain effective
whenever the snapback countermeasure is not deployed. Might defendants
just continue to give it a try? Not all plaintiffs' attorneys will know of the
countermeasure, and some might fail to deploy it properly and on time. There
would seem to be little downside for the defendant. Even if the case is
"snapped back" to state court, the defendant loses nothing and may gain in
some way from the added delay.
Also, because the proposal does not disallow snap removal (and in some
ways may be seen as enshrining it), it would seem that defendants could claim
an objectively reasonable basis for snap removal and thereby stay clear of
any fee-shifting consequences under Section 1447(c). 231 If defendants adopt

228

Hellman et al., supra note 68 at 108-110.

229

Hellman et al., supra note 68 at 108-110.

230

FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (any dismissal for failure to timely serve must be without prejudice).

231

See Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 132 (2005) (fee-shifting available under

Section 1447(c) only if the defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removing).
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a "might as well try it" attitude, then plaintiffs and courts will still need to
divert resources to achieve the proposal's intended goal.
Fourth, the snapback countermeasure makes the already long and
complicated statutory scheme for removal even longer and more
complicated. This reflects a longstanding trend. The removal statutes are
filled with complicated moving parts added over the years in reaction to
games and strategies developed by enterprising lawyers. Adding yet one
more moving part can potentially correct the problems presented by snap
removal but does so at the accompanying cost of still more length and
complexity in the removal statute.

2. The AAJ Proposed Change to Rule 4 and Service of Process
The American Association for Justice (AAJ) (formerly ATLA - the
American Trial Lawyers Association)3 has suggested eliminating snap
removal not through an amendment to the removal statutes but to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4. In particular the AAJ proposal would add a new subsection (6) to Rule
4(d) that reads:
(6) Constructive Waiver. When any defendant has actual
notice that a lawsuit has been filed against it, all defendants
to the lawsuit will be deemed to have waived service of the
summons, provided that formal service takes place within
thirty (30) days of any action taken by any defendant so that
all defendants have formal notice of the lawsuit and it shall
be deemed that such service will relate back to the date of
actional notice to any defendant.2
The AAJ proposal would in essence substitute knowledge of a lawsuit for
formal service, at least as regards removal so long as service is effectuated
within 30 days. Although aimed at snap removal, this constructive date of
service-via-notice/knowledge would presumably affect other deadlines in
civil litigation - which is one reason it is not our favored solution. Altering
the effective date of service may have unintended consequences that are too
difficult to calculate in advance. Even if the ripple effects of the AAJ change

212 As is generally known, the AAJ is "the world's largest plaintiff trial bar" with members that

"primarily represented plaintiffs in personal injury actions, employment rights cases, consumer
cases, and other civil actions." See Letter from AM Pres. Bruce Stern to Rebecca A. Womeldorf,
Sec., Comm. on Rules of Pract. and Proc., Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts. at 1 (August 30, 2019).
233
1 d. at 3.
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could be calculated with precision, we are reluctant to support a change in
procedural law (either rule or statute) 3 that goes beyond what is needed to
address the perceived problem of snap removal. The AAJ nonetheless argues
that:
[t]he addition of a constructive waiver Section to Rule 4
would simply provide that when any one defendant has
actual notice that a lawsuit against it has been filed, all
defendants will be deemed to have waived service of the
summons so that service will relate back to the date of actual
notice. Thus, defendants have actual notice who are trolling
state filings would no longer be allowed to snap remove the
case to federal court under § 1441(b)(2), and removal
proceedings would instead be carried out as intended by [the
forum defendant rule, so long as service takes place within
30 days of commencement of the action].235
Section 1441(b)(2) was enacted so that plaintiffs do not
name, and then never serve, an in-state defendant in order to

2 4

1 There are, of course, technical and practical differences between amending a Rule of Civil

Procedure and amending a statute. The latter requires passage by the House and Senate with
Presidential signature or congressional override of a veto. With the strong anticipated opposition of
the defense bar and commercial defendants such as drug companies, passage of anti-snap removal
legislation appears a hard lift in the current political climate.
Amendment of a civil rule avoids some but not all of the legislative concerns, which may be
part of its attraction to the AAJ. Pursuant to the 28 U.S.C.

§ 2072

(The Rules Enabling Act), an

amendment is respectively promulgated by the Civil Rules Committee, the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the U.S. Supreme Court, whereupon the new or revised rule
becomes effective in roughly six months unless Congress intervenes.
In practice, however, this path may be only slightly less daunting than amending the removal
statute. Many judges, at least half the practicing legal profession (the portion representing plaintiffs)
and, insofar as we can determine, all law professors with an opinion oppose snap removal. But
conversely, defense lawyers and roughly half the judges addressing the issue, including all nine
federal circuit judges that have weighed in, have "approved" snap removal.
We used the work approved advisedly in that judges sustaining snap removal have done so due
to a professed compulsion commanded by the "and served" language of Section 1441(b)(2). While
these judges have not found literal application of the language to create an "absurd" result, this is
not the same as approval of snap removal. So far as we can determine, no current Supreme Court
Justice has expressed an opinion regarding snap removal.
It thus seems to us that the political barriers to change regarding snap removal are nearly as
high when pursuing a rule change as if pursuing statutory amendment.
235 Stern, supra note 229, at 3.
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avoid removal, and the proposed rule's requirement of
formal service within 30 days would satisfy this concern. If
services does not occur within 30 days, then § 1441(b)(2)
can take effect.23 6

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the AAJ proposal was specifically opposed by
Lawyers for Civil Justice ("LCJ"), a group representing defendant
interests. 237 In addition to defending snap removal on the merits based on the
language of Section 1441(b)(2) and in light of the Second and Third Circuit
decisions approving the tactic, LCJ argued that using a revision to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4 to negate a statute was improper and violated the Enabling Act
requirement that Rules changes not "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right" of litigants. 238

3. Treating the Forum Defendant Rule as Jurisdictional
Also suggested is amendment to the Judicial Code that makes clear that
the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional and therefore cannot be
circumvented based on lack of service on the forum defendant or the relevant
timing of removal vs. service. Prior to the 1948 Amendment the removal
statute, the Judiciary Act of 1789

236

Id.

at 3-4 (footnote omitted).

2Although

the LCJ letter, unlike the AAJ letter, does not specifically identify the

organization's ideological and jurisprudential orientation, the LCJ letterhead gives more than a little
clue as to the group's orientation in that it reflects a Board of Directors with representatives of Ford
Motor Co., Boston Scientific, Merck & Co., Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Eli Lilly
& Co., Medtronic, Microsoft, Shell Oil, Exxon Mobil, State Farm, and several prominent defense
firms such as Bowman and Brooke, Gordon & Rees, and Goldberg Segalla. See Letter from LCJ
President Mike Weston to Rebecca A. Womeldorf at 1 (October 15, 2019).

Similarly, the

organization's website describes LCJ members as "preeminent corporate and defense counsel" that
are

concerned about "[t]he soaring cost of litigation." See LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST.,
https://www.lfcj.com/about-us.html (last visited at Sept. 25, 2020). A closer look at the Group's
substantive concerns reflects concern that Multidistrict Litigation proceedings "have become onesided forums for settlement pressure that lack the protections of the" Federal Civil Rules, that Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) imposes undue burdens on corporate defendants and their representatives, that
discovery directed at defendants is unduly burdensome, and that courts are lax in admitting expert
testimony proffered by plaintiffs. Id.
2 8
1 See

Weston, supra note 237, at 2. In addition, LCJ argued that an imposed waiver of service

effective retroactively violated the due process rights of defendants and argued that removal was
not particularly disadvantageous to plaintiffs because the substantive law to be applied would not
change based on the forum.
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achieved its preferred result by declining to extend removal
jurisdiction to suits initiated against forum defendants in
state court. Current law, by contrast, has been interpreted as
a non-jurisdictional barrier to the removal of suits naming
forum defendants. By framing the barrier to removal of cases
involving forum defendants in jurisdictional terms, Congress
could presumably end the practice of snap removal. The
forum defendant rule would thus resemble the jurisdictional
rule of complete diversity, which operates as a barrier to
removal that snap removal cannot overcome. 239
To date, however, we have not seen this assessment set forth in proposed
legislation or suggested language amending the removal statute.

4. The Clermont-Pfander Fix
In testimony before a U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee, Professor
James Pfander outlined a proposal he deemed the "Clermont Fix" as it arose
out of correspondence between the two scholars. 240 Under this proposal,
which accords with our view that a defendant does not have standing to
remove until it has actually been brought into the action via service of
process, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 would be amended to make removal available only
to a "properly served defendant" rather than merely a "defendant," as the
current statute reads. The revised Section 1446(a) would state:
(a) Generally - a properly served defendant or defendants
desiring to remove any civil action from a State court
shall file in the district court of the United States for the
district and division within which such action is pending

2

11 See Examining the Use of "Snap" Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet, 1

16h

Cong. 2 (2019)

(statement of James E. Pfander, Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker
School of Law) (footnote omitted) (further noting that "[m]ost courts take the position that the forum
defendant rule "is a mandatory, but non-jurisdictional, case processing rule.") Id. at 10, n. 18, citing

Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018); Morris v.
Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2015); In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378 (5th Cir.
2009) and also noting, however, that "[s]ome courts have viewed the forum-defendant rule as

jurisdictional for some purposes" (citing Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2006), which
found the forum defendant rule jurisdictional in that appellate review of a remand order was
precluded).
"See

Pfander, supra note 239, at 11.
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a notice of removal ... containing a short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal, together with a
copy of the process, pleadings, and orders served upon
such defendant or defendants in such action.
Professor Clermont notes that prior to the advent of the snap removal
tactic, it was "pretty much accepted law" that if Plaintiff served a non-forum
Defendant first, this Defendant "could remove despite" the naming of a
forum defendant in the complaint but that Plaintiff had "the protective
ability" to serve the forum Defendant first in order to block removal. 241 He
characterizes such an amendment as one that
[w]ould hardly be radical. The removal statutes seem to
assume that the removing defendant is already in the action.
It is pre-service removal that makes snap removal so
controversial. Pre-service removal also enables defendants
to avoid the all-defendants-must-consent rule in [28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(2)(a)]. 24 2
In his testimony before a House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee,
Professor Pfander endorsed this approach, implicitly agreeing with this
article's view that decisions permitting snap removal are inconsistent with
U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 24 He noted that:
[m] any aspects of the Clermont fix fit well with current law.
For starters, removal law tends to assume that the parties
effecting removal have been served; indeed, the Supreme
Court made this assumption explicit, holding that the 30-day
removal clock begins when defendants have been formally
served with the complaint. The holding rejected the removaldefeating strategies of plaintiffs who were acting to shorten
the time for removal by providing defendants with preservice courtesy copies of the complaint. The Clermont fix
would accomplish something similar, deferring removal
until after the removing defendant has been served.

24 1

Memorandum from Professor Clermont to Professor Pfander, quoted in Pfander, supra note

239, at 11.
242Id.
2 43
See TAN 183-193, supra (discussing Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526
U.S. 344 (1999).
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In addition, the Clermont fix would preserve much of current
law while allowing the plaintiff to exercise control of the
timing of service and thereby pretermit snap removal by
serving the forum defendant first. If no removal can be had
until service on at least one defendant has been perfected,
then the plaintiff can make a strategic choice. Current law
already incorporates such choices on the part of plaintiffs,
giving all defendants a full 30 days to remove after service,
but enabling plaintiffs to shorten the total time for removal
by serving all defendants at roughly the same time. See 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B)-(C). While further study may be
warranted, it appears to me at present that the Clermont fix
provides the cleanest solution to the problem of snap
removal."2
C. A Preferencefor Simplicity and Prevention in Restoring Fairness

and CongressionalIntent and Purpose
The Hellman et al. proposal discussed above has been characterized as a
curative or corrective approach to the snap removal problem in that it does
not bar snap removal but provides a means by which a removed case
involving a forum defendant may be snapped back to federal court.
By contrast, the other proposed means of addressing snap removal are
preventive in that they would all stop removal in cases involving a forum
defendant. The AAJ Rule 4 proposal deems service effective upon and
retroactive to the date of notice. The jurisdictional proposal makes removal
of a case involving a forum defendant a nullity. The Clermont/Pfander
proposal precludes removal unless the defendant has been served, which in
turn effectively precludes snap removal unless the plaintiff provides
defendants with the opportunity by initially serving a non-forum
defendant. 4 5 Our proposed correction-by-subtraction that excises the "and
served" language from the statute also prevents snap removal from taking
place unless plaintiff does not effect service within 120 days.

24 4

Pfander, supra note 239, at 11-12, n.21, citing Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 356 (1999) and

summarizing it as "dating the time for removal from the date of service of process, rather than form
the earlier date on which the plaintiff sent the defendant a courtesy copy of the complaint."
2 5

And to perhaps point out the obvious, snap removal is precluded in any case where there is

only one defendant that is a citizen of the forum.
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All of the anti-snap removal proposals have merit and would improve
upon the current doleful situation that seems to grow increasingly worse at
the appellate level. But like Professor Pfander, we think that in the context of
snap removal, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."246
Consequently, we have concerns that the Hellman et al. proposal is not
optimal in that it at least partially institutionalizes and validates snap removal,
something we find conceptually troubling in that the practice should have
been uniformly rejected had all courts adopted the correct characterization
and analysis of the practice.
To be sure, the Hellman et al. proposal provides a ready means of undoing
snap removal that, if effectively implemented by plaintiffs, would probably
lead to the withering away of the tactic or at least make it inconsequential.
But even this best-case outcome has the effect of not only making the removal
process more complex and logistically cumbersome but also lengthening an
already long and complex removal law.
It also creates a new opportunity for gamesmanship. A defendant may,
pursuant to the Helman et al. revision, effect snap removal and then seek to
evade service of process long enough to prevent plaintiff's restoration of the
case to federal court. In addition, the prospect of the service-dodging
defendant could result in trial courts:
[T]empted to proceed with the parties then before the court
as the plaintiff seeks to serve the forum defendant. Or district
courts might put the matter on hold pending some resolution
of the service question. Either way, the plaintiff's ability to
secure an adjudication of the merits in state court will have
been thwarted or delayed.
What's more, the proposed statute could be read to establish
a mid-course switch from state to federal rules for the
determination of the timing and legality of service of process
on forum defendants. 247

246
247

See Pfander, supra note 239, at 7.
See Pfander, supra note 239, at 8. Elaborating, Professor Pfander explained that:

[u]nder current law, plaintiffs filing in state court effect service of process on defendants
in accordance with state law. If some properly served (or docket-monitoring) defendants
agree to remove, federal law specifies the rule that governs post-removal service of
process on unserved defendants. Section 1448 provides that in cases in which service has
not been perfected prior to removal, service may be "completed" (as specified in state
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The AAJ "notice-deemed-service" amendment to Rule 4 has the virtue of
preventing snap removal but does so through the indirect means of amending
a Civil Rule rather than the removal statute containing the problematic
language that is the source of the problem. In addition, as discussed above, it
has the potential to lead to unintended consequences and make for an
overbroad solution to the snap removal problem that could needlessly create
additional problems.
Treating the forum defendant rule as jurisdictional in the manner of the
complete diversity rule would work if it could be aptly operationalized. But
this method of preventing snap removal would, absent additional provisions,
re-open the door to plaintiffs naming forum state defendants merely to thwart
removal rather than for the process or prosecuting legitimate claims against
the forum defendant. The 1948 Congress sought to close that door, a
sentiment likely shared by modern legislators.
The Clermont-Pfander proposal holds promise and like our preferred
correction of the snap removal problem, is relatively modest and easy to
effectuate. Clermont & Pfander seek only to add two words to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446, while our prime objective is deleting two words from Section
1441(b)(2). Our proposal then has the extra textual burden of adding
language that would require service of the forum state defendant within 120
days in order to prevent delayed removal. No similar provision appears to be
part of the Clermont-Pfander approach.
In this case, however, we think the added verbiage and service
requirement is worth the modest increase in burdens and complexity in that
it increases the likelihood that a forum state defendant is genuinely joined to
face claims on the merits rather than for procedural maneuvering. While
Clermont-Pfander does not encourage such maneuvering and does require
service of the forum state defendant in order to thwart snap removal, it holds
open more prospect than we would like for snap removal facilitated by
ministerial error. For example, a less skilled attorney may bungle into serving
a non-forum defendant ahead of service on the forum defendant. Or the

rules) or new process "issued in the same manner as in case originally filed" in federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1448. The proposed statute might be read to eliminate the state law
"completion" option and compel new process to issue in compliance with federal rules.
In any case, uncertainty as to the operation of new Section 1447(f) and current Section
1448 might occasion further litigation.

Id.
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process servers retained by counsel may mistakenly fail to serve the forum
defendant first.
Alternatively, the burdens of service on a forum defendant may be
sufficiently vexing (perhaps because of intentional misconduct by the forum
defendant) that easier and more immediate service on a non-forum defendant
gets effected, inadvertently stripping the plaintiff of the protections of the
forum defendant rule. By contrast, under our proposal, snap removal is
precluded for 120 days, which should be ample time for plaintiffs to deal with
service difficulties surrounding forum and non-forum defendants.
V.

CONCLUSION

Treatment of snap removal tactics has been something less than the
judiciary's finest hour, particularly at the appellate level. Too many judges
have permitted use of this problematic procedural loophole. Congress can
and should correct this emerging wrong turn in the law.

